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CYBERSECURITY AND EXECUTIVE POWER 
DAVID W. OPDERBECK

 
ABSTRACT 
This Article analyzes the constitutional authority of the President to 
shut down or limit public access to the Internet in a time of national 
emergency. The threats posed by cybercrime, cyberwarfare, and 
cyberterrorism are significant. It is imperative that national governments 
and international policymakers develop defenses and contingency plans 
for such attacks. At the same time, the threats to civil liberties posed by 
current legislative cybersecurity proposals are equally real. Executive 
power to disrupt Internet access in the name of security can become as 
potent a weapon against democracy as a hacker’s attempt to take down 
the power grid. This Article examines current cybersecurity proposals in 
Congress and explains why they are in many ways misguided. It then 
examines the constitutional law of presidential power against the 
backdrop of recent efforts by Congress and the Executive to regulate 
cyberspace. The Article concludes with a proposed cybersecurity policy 
matrix, which could help courts and policymakers manage the difficult 
constitutional and policy tensions raised by the problem of cybersecurity. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In January and February 2011, an extraordinary wave of popular revolt 
swept through parts of North Africa.
1
 Citizens in Tunisia and Egypt, who 
had been dominated by autocratic governments for decades, overthrew 
their rulers, including long-time Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak.
2
 
Some called the events in Egypt a “Facebook Revolution,” symbolized by 
its youthful leaders, such as Google executive Wael Ghonim.
3
 The Internet 
and social networks facilitated a degree of coordination and courage 
among ordinary people that would have been unthinkable less than a 
decade ago. Ghonim, who was imprisoned for twelve days before 
Mubarak’s fall for helping organize protests through Facebook, 
exuberantly stated after Mubarak resigned, “This revolution started on 
 
 
 1. See, e.g., The Upheaval in Egypt: An End or a Beginning?, ECONOMIST, Feb. 5, 2011, at 35, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18063746?story_id=18063746. 
 2. See, e.g., Egypt After Mubarak: Where Now for Egypt and the Region?, ECONOMIST (Feb. 
15, 2011, 5:21 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/02/egypt_after_mubarak. 
 3. See, e.g., Catharine Smith, Egypt’s Facebook Revolution: Wael Ghonim Thanks the Social 
Network, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2011, 3:36 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/02/11/ 
egypt-facebook-revolution-wael-ghonim_n_822078.html; see also After Mubarak: The Autumn of the 
Patriarchs, ECONOMIST, Feb. 19, 2011, at 29, available at http://www.economist.com/node/18186984 
?story_id=18186984. 
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Facebook. This revolution started . . . in June 2010 when hundreds of 
thousands of Egyptians started collaborating content.”4 
In fact, cyberspace was in many ways the front line of the Egyptian 
revolution. Although Mubarak apparently lacked the support among the 
Egyptian military for sustained attacks on civilians, he waged a desperate 
last-gasp battle to shut down access to the Internet so that organizers could 
not effectively communicate with each other, the public, or the outside 
world.
5
  
Could a similar battle over cyberspace be waged in developed 
democracies, such as the United States? Policymakers in the West are 
justifiably concerned about cyberattacks, cyberterrorism, and the 
possibility of cyberwar. The raging question is whether a democratic state 
governed by constitutional principles and committed to free speech and 
private property rights can promote cybersecurity without destroying the 
Internet’s unique capacity to foster civil liberties. 
Cyberspace is as vulnerable as it is vital. The threat is real. President 
Obama recently declared that “cyber threat is one of the most serious 
economic and national security challenges we face as a nation” and that 
“America’s economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on 
cybersecurity.”6 Cybersecurity has been described as “a major national 
security problem for the United States.”7 Private and public cyber-
infrastructure in the United States falls under nearly constant attack, often 
from shadowy sources connected to terrorist groups, organized crime 
syndicates, or foreign governments.
8
 These attacks bear the potential to 
disrupt not only e-mail and other online communications networks, but 
also the national energy grid, military-defense ground and satellite 
facilities, transportation systems, financial markets, and other essential 
 
 
 4. Smith, supra note 3. 
 5. See, e.g., Internet Blackouts: Reaching for the Kill Switch, ECONOMIST, Feb. 12, 2011, at 58, 
available at http://www.economist.com/node/18112043?story_id=18112043. Whether this revolution 
will prove stable over the long term, of course, remains a live and difficult question. See, e.g., Egypt’s 
Turmoil: It Goes On and On, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 11, 2012, http://www.economist.com/node/2154 
7294. 
 6. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation’s Cyber 
Infrastructure (May 29, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-securing-our-nations-cyber-infrastructure.  
 7. CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, SECURING CYBERSPACE FOR THE 44TH PRESIDENCY 
1 (2008) [hereinafter CSIS REPORT], available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/081208_securing 
cyberspace_44.pdf. 
 8. See infra Part II. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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facilities.
9
 In short, a substantial cyberattack could take down the nation’s 
entire security and economic infrastructure.
10
 
U.S. policymakers are justifiably concerned by this threat. Existing 
U.S. law is not equipped to handle the problem. The United States 
currently relies on a patchwork of laws and regulations designed primarily 
to address the “computer crime” of a decade ago, as well as controversial 
antiterrorism legislation passed after the September 11 attacks, and some 
general (and equally controversial) principles of executive power in times 
of emergency. 
Current proposals for containing the threat, however, could 
significantly increase U.S. government power—particularly presidential 
power—over the Internet. An influential report that informs current U.S. 
policy bluntly offers this remedy for holes in cybersecurity: “Regulate 
cyberspace.”11 According to the report, “[t]he United States must . . . set 
minimum standards for securing cyberspace in order to ensure that the 
delivery of critical services in cyberspace continues if the United States is 
attacked.”12  
This broad regulatory approach was reflected in a bill introduced in the 
Senate, the “Cybersecurity Act of 2009.”13 The Cybersecurity Act’s most 
controversial provision was a grant of authority to the President to 
“declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the limitation or shutdown 
of Internet traffic to and from any compromised Federal Government or 
United States critical infrastructure information system or network.”14 In 
short, the President would have been authorized to shut down cyberspace, 
or at least the portion of cyberspace that interfaces with the United States. 
Cyber civil libertarians reacted to this proposal with swift anger. No 
threat, they argued, justifies empowering the President with an Internet 
“kill switch.”15 In response to these complaints, more recently proposed 
 
 
 9. See infra Part II.  
 10. See infra Part II. Some commentators, however, argue that the claimed threats are 
exaggerated and that the Internet is inherently self-healing. See Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 584, 616–21 (2011). Professor Bambauer would focus cybersecurity regulation on 
mandating data redundancy. Id. at 643–53. Data redundancy is certainly good policy in general, 
although making multiple copies of sensitive data means that there are multiple avenues through which 
that data can be stolen. But at least two questions remain: given redundant systems, what would 
constitute an “emergency”; and what authority, if any, should the President have in case of such an 
event? 
 11. CSIS REPORT, supra note 7, at 2. 
 12. Id. 
 13. S. 773, 111th Cong. (as introduced, Apr. 1, 2009). 
 14. Id. § 18(2). 
 15. See, e.g., Jon Swartz, Should the Internet Have an ‘Off’ Switch?, USA TODAY, Feb. 16, 
2011, at 1B. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/2
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legislation softens the kill switch language.
16
 Nevertheless, it appears that 
the President could retain the power to “disconnect” compromised 
portions of the Internet without the need for any prior judicial review. 
Cybersecurity policy thus raises fascinating and difficult questions 
about regulatory design, executive power, and jurisdiction over 
“cyberspace.” This Article examines the President’s ability to exert 
emergency control over cyberspace under U.S. law. Part II describes some 
serious threats to cybersecurity, including the practice of cyberwar, and 
surveys existing law and proposed legislation relating to cybersecurity. 
Part III examines constitutional limitations and the President’s ability to 
control cyberspace, including in a time of cyber crisis or cyberwar. Part IV 
begins to develop a matrix for constructing a balanced cybersecurity 
policy, which is explored more fully in Part V.  
II. CYBERWAR AND THE MOVE TO REGULATE CYBERSPACE 
A. Cyberwarfare, Cyberterrorism, and Organized Cybercrime 
Cyber is the new domain of international espionage, sabotage, and war. 
China, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States employ 
extensive cyber spying networks.
17
 A coordinated series of denial-of-
service and other attacks could cripple a state’s political and 
communications systems, as happened during “Web War 1” between 
Russia and Estonia in 2007.
18
 Cyberattacks can directly impact “real” 
infrastructure: “As computer networks collapse, factories and chemical 
plants explode, satellites spin out of control and the financial and power 
grids fail.”19 
In June 2010, for example, a computer worm called “Stuxnet” was 
discovered in Iran.
20
 At first inspection, it appeared to be a routine bit of 
malware. Closer analysis, however, revealed that Stuxnet was carefully 
designed to disrupt the sort of systems that help control equipment at 
 
 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 32, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792?story_id=16478792&CFID=158391401&CFTOKEN=341
82131. 
 18. Id. 
 19. The Threat from the Internet: Cyberwar, ECONOMIST, July 3, 2010, at 50, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/16481504?story_id=16481504&CFID=158391401&CFTOKEN=341
82131. 
 20. Kim Zetter, Clues Suggest Stuxnet Virus Was Built for Subtle Nuclear Sabotage, WIRED 
THREAT LEVEL (Nov. 15, 2010, 4:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/stuxnet-clues. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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nuclear power plants.
21
 Stuxnet’s subtlety and sophistication suggested to 
most experts that it was engineered not by rogue hackers, but rather by an 
entity with the resources of a nation-state, and that it was specifically 
targeted to damage Iran’s nuclear capabilities.22 It almost certainly was a 
cyberattack launched by Israel or the United States.
23
  
Recent evidence suggests that Stuxnet successfully curtailed Iran’s 
production of refined uranium.
24
 The Stuxnet attack appears to have bled 
into “real” space: the Iranian scientist chiefly responsible for eradicating 
Stuxnet from Iran’s nuclear plants was killed on November 29, 2010, by 
assassins on motorbikes who stuck a bomb to his car.
25
 
While Stuxnet is an example of a probable cyberattack by the United 
States and its allies, many experts believe that the United States is among 
the most vulnerable nations to a cyberattack. Every aspect of the U.S. 
economy and infrastructure depends on digital interconnections. Leading 
cybersecurity writer Richard Clarke suggests that “cyber war places this 
country [the United States] at greater jeopardy than it does any other 
nation.”26 Indeed, many experts believe that, even now,  
[c]omputer hackers in China, including those working on behalf of 
the Chinese government and military, have penetrated deeply into 
the information systems of U.S. companies and government 
agencies, stolen proprietary information from American executives 
in advance of their business meetings in China, and, in a few cases, 
gained access to electric power plants in the United States . . . .
27
  
 
 
 21. Id.  
 22. Id.; see also NICOLAS FALLIERE ET AL., W32.STUXNET DOSSIER (Symantec Security 
Response, Version 1.4, 2011), available at http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/ 
security_response/whitepapers/w32_stuxnet_dossier.pdf. 
 23. See Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in 
History, WIRED THREAT LEVEL (July 11, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/ 
how-digital-detectives-deciphered-stuxnet/all/1 (noting that “[s]uspicions of course were growing that 
Israel and the U.S. were behind Stuxnet and had used the malware as a devious alternative to bombing 
Iran’s nuclear plant”). 
 24. The Stuxnet Worm: Yet to Turn, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2010, at 39, available at http://www. 
economist.com/node/17730556?story_id=17730556&CFID=158391401&CFTOKEN=34182131. It 
should be noted, however, that many cybercrimes are perpetrated by local Western individuals or low-
level syndicates that disguise their attacks to appear as though they originate in “likely suspect” 
countries. See MCAFEE, INC., MCAFEE VIRTUAL CRIMINOLOGY REPORT: CYBERCRIME VERSUS 
CYBERLAW 12 (2009). 
 25. The Stuxnet Worm: Yet to Turn, supra note 24. 
 26. RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT THREAT TO NATIONAL 
SECURITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT xiii (2010). 
 27. Shane Harris, China’s Cyber-Militia, NAT’L J., May 31, 2008, at 32, available at http:// 
nationaljournal.com/njmagazine/cs_20080531_6948.php; see also Ben Worthen, Wide Cyber Attack is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/2
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The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 
recently reported that “[d]uring 2008, there were 54,640 identified 
[cyber]attacks against the Department of Defense; in 2009, there were 
71,661 incidents reported; and through June 30 of 2010, there were 60,026 
incidents reported.”28 Most analysts now agree that cyberwar is 
inevitable.
29
  
Cyberspace also provides a home base for organized crime and 
terrorism. The distribution of malware designed to harvest personal and 
corporate information now is largely run by syndicates, many based in 
Russia, Nigeria, China, Brazil, or other organized crime havens, that 
control networks of tens of millions of infected computers called 
“botnets.”30 Cybercrime may cost the U.S. economy $1 trillion annually,31 
and cybercriminals frequently launder money through “virtual” worlds, 
such as Second Life.
32
 Moreover, “there is a growing swell of opinion that 
[terrorist] hackers will eventually be bold enough and powerful enough to 
launch attacks that will damage and destroy critical national 
infrastructure.”33 In short, cybercrime, cyberterrorism, and cyberwar are 
synergistically blending into a massive perfect storm over the nation’s 
information infrastructure.  
B. Major Cybersecurity Proposals: 2009–2012 
One of the most vexing policy issues raised by cybersecurity is that 
most critical physical cyber assets, such as routers, cables, servers, and 
interconnected machines and devices, are private property.
34
 As the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation recently noted,  
 
 
Linked to China, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 2009, at A18, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123 
834671171466791.html. 
 28. S. REP. NO. 111-384, at 2 (2010). 
 29. PETER SOMMER & IAN BROWN, REDUCING SYSTEMIC CYBERSECURITY RISK 81 (2011), 
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/57/44/46889922.pdf (“[I]n nearly all future wars as well as 
the skirmishes that precede them policymakers must expect the use of cyberweaponry as a disrupter or 
force multiplier, deployed in conjunction with more conventional kinetic weaponry.”). 
 30. See Cyberwar: War in the Fifth Domain, supra note 17. 
 31. CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 2 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/ 
documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
 32. MCAFEE, INC., supra note 24, at 5. 
 33. Id. at 7. 
 34. See, e.g., SOMMER & BROWN, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that “[l]arge sections of the Critical 
National Infrastructure of most OECD countries are in [sic] not under direct government control but in 
private ownership. Governments tend to respond by referring to Public Private Partnerships but this 
relationship is under-explored and full of tensions. The ultimate duty of a private company is to 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The private sector owns a large percentage of the nation’s critical 
infrastructure, including electricity generation and transmission, 
water and sewer treatment facilities, and financial markets and 
clearinghouses. The computers that run these systems are often 
interconnected and subject to the same potential attacks as other 
networks. Experts suggest that cyber attacks against critical 
infrastructure potentially could physically destroy infrastructure, 
depriving large populations of essential goods and services for 
extended periods of time and threatening lives.
35
 
Likewise, most intangible cyber assets—including data and cultural 
products—are either covered by private intellectual property rights and 
trade secrets or are in the public domain. Moreover, the very term 
“cybersecurity,” with that curious prefix “cyber,” highlights a basic 
question first raised at the dawn of the Internet age: who “owns” the 
Internet? The questions about presidential power explored in this Article, 
then, ask whether “cyberspace” is a sort of “space” over which the 
President can exert executive authority. The answers Congress has been 
exploring reflect a decidedly cyber-minimalist and executive power-
maximalist approach: in a “cyber emergency,” the President would 
possess the legal power to shut down—or at least significantly limit—
public access to the Internet.
36
 
The following subparts describe the major comprehensive 
cybersecurity proposals that Congress has considered over the past three 
years. It is instructive to explore each of these proposals in depth in order 
to survey the policy landscape and to examine how policymakers’ views 
have changed—in form if not in substance—in response to concerns raised 
by civil society groups. 
1. The Cybersecurity Acts of 2009 and 2010 
The Cybersecurity Act of 2009 was introduced by Senators Rockefeller 
and Snowe on April 1, 2009.
37
 Much of the bill was concerned with 
establishing technical standards and funding training, research, and 
 
 
provide returns for its shareholders whereas a Government’s concern is with overall public security 
and safety.”). 
 35. S. REP. NO. 111-384, at 2 (2010). 
 36. Whether it is technologically possible to “shut down the Internet” is a different question. 
 37. S. 773, 111th Cong. (as introduced, Apr. 1, 2009); S. REP. NO. 111-384, at 5. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/2
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development in the field of cybersecurity. These provisions were relatively 
uncontroversial.
38
 
More controversially, the 2009 bill would have delegated to the 
President various responsibilities relating to cybersecurity.
39
 Under this 
proposed authority as set forth in the 2009 version of the bill, the President 
[m]ay declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the limitation or 
shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any compromised Federal 
Government or United States critical infrastructure information 
system or network [and m]ay order the disconnection of any Federal 
Government or United States critical infrastructure information 
systems or networks in the interest of national security.
40
 
There were no time limitations, congressional or judicial review 
procedures, reporting requirements, or other substantive or procedural 
requirements attached to these provisions.  
The bill was referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, which held two hearings and reported out a revised bill, 
the “Cybersecurity Act of 2010,” on March 24, 2010.41 In the revised bill, 
the President’s authority under the “cyber emergency” provisions was 
significantly muted.
42
 The President would promulgate, after public notice 
and comment, a set of cyber emergency response plans.
43
 The President 
would retain the authority to “declare a cybersecurity emergency,” which 
would trigger implementation of the emergency response plans.
44
 Within 
forty-eight hours after declaring a cybersecurity emergency, the President 
would be required to report to Congress, with supplemental reports every 
thirty days until the emergency declaration was removed.
45
 The bill 
claimed that “[t]his section does not authorize, and shall not be construed 
to authorize, an expansion of existing Presidential authorities.”46  
 
 
 38. S. 773 §§ 3–17 (as introduced, Apr. 1, 2009). 
 39. Id. § 18. 
 40. Id. § 18(2), (6). 
 41. S. 773, 111th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Mar. 24, 
2010); S. REP. NO. 111-384, at 5. 
 42. S. 773 § 201 (as reported by S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., Mar. 24, 2010). 
 43. Id. § 201(a)(1).  
 44. Id. § 201(b)(2). 
 45. Id. § 201(b)(3). 
 46. Id. § 201(c).  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 
The proposed Protecting Cyberspace as a National Asset Act of 2010 
(“PCNA”) was introduced by Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Carper on 
June 10, 2010.
47
 Like the bill introduced by Senators Rockefeller and 
Snowe, the PCNA would have established an Office of Cyberspace Policy, 
with a director appointed by the President, and included provisions for 
enhancing communication, training, and emergency readiness regarding 
cybersecurity risks.
48
 Also like the 2009 bill, the PCNA included 
exceptionally broad definitions of “cyberspace” and “information 
infrastructure.” “Cyberspace” was defined as “the interdependent network 
of information infrastructure, and includes the Internet, 
telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers in critical industries.”49 “Information 
infrastructure” was defined as “the underlying framework that information 
systems and assets rely on to process, transmit, receive, or store 
information electronically, including programmable electronic devices and 
communications networks and any associated hardware, software, or 
data.”50 And, like the 2009 bill, the PCNA would have authorized the 
President to declare a “national cyber emergency,” which would trigger an 
Internet shutdown.
51
  
Indeed, the enhancement of presidential authority in cyberspace was 
one of the primary goals of the PCNA. As a report on the bill prepared by 
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
stated, 
The Committee understands that Section 706 [of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934] gives the President the authority 
to take over wire communications in the United States and, if the 
President so chooses, shut a network down. But it is not clear that 
the President could order a lesser action, such as the blocking of a 
particular malicious signature or directing a company outside of the 
communications sector, such as an electricity generation facility, to 
 
 
 47. S. 3480, 111th Cong. (as reported by S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affairs, 
Dec. 15, 2010); S. REP. NO. 111-368, at 15. 
 48. S. 3480 §§ 101–107.  
 49. Id. § 3(3). 
 50. Id. § 3(8). 
 51. Id. § 249. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/2
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take action to protect its cyber networks. It is this gap that S. 3480 is 
meant to fill.
52
 
The definitional procedural safeguards surrounding such a declaration, 
however, were enhanced in the PCNA—or at least they appeared 
enhanced upon a cursory reading.
53
  
Under the PCNA, a “national cyber emergency” could be declared “if 
there is an ongoing or imminent action by any individual or entity to 
exploit a cyber risk in a manner that disrupts, attempts to disrupt, or poses 
a significant risk of disruption to the operation of the information 
infrastructure essential to the reliable operation of covered critical 
infrastructure.”54 Although “cyber risk” was undefined, “risk” was defined 
as “the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, as 
determined by the likelihood of the occurrence of the incident and the 
associated consequences, including potential for an adverse outcome 
assessed as a function of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences 
associated with an incident.”55 An “incident” included any occurrence that 
“actually or imminently jeopardizes” the security of or information within 
information infrastructure, as well as any occurrence that “constitutes a 
violation of security policies, security procedures, or acceptable use 
policies applicable to information infrastructure.”56 
In his or her declaration of a cyber emergency, the President would 
have been required to identify “covered critical infrastructure” implicated 
in the emergency.
57
 The declaration would trigger an obligation for 
“owners and operators of [the] covered critical infrastructure” to 
implement a response plan.
58
 The PCNA defined “critical infrastructure” 
with reference to the definition provided in the Patriot Act:  
[S]ystems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the 
United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national 
 
 
 52. S. REP. NO. 111-368, at 10. 
 53. The committee report casts this in a positive, but ultimately ominous, light: “It would allow 
the President to take such action quickly, without any debate over what authorities the government 
actually has or the need to resort to the drastic measure of taking over an entire communications 
network.” Id. 
 54. S. 3480 § 249(a)(1). 
 55. Id. § 3(19). 
 56. Id. § 3(7); see id. § 3551(b)(3). 
 57. Id. § 249(a)(2). 
 58. Id. § 249(a)(3)(A). 
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economic security, national public health or safety, or any 
combination of those matters.
59
 
The terms “owners” and “operators” were undefined. Response plans 
would have been required to comply with regulations to be issued by the 
Director of the Office of Cyberspace Policy (“DCP”).60 The bill stated that 
a determination that an asset is “critical infrastructure” may be appealed to 
the Secretary of Homeland Security, but that the Secretary’s determination 
is not subject to judicial review.
61
 
In addition to triggering the implementation of emergency response 
plans, the President’s declaration of a cyber emergency would have 
empowered the DCP to enact additional “emergency measures or actions 
necessary to preserve the reliable operation, and mitigate or remediate the 
consequences of the potential disruption, of covered critical 
infrastructure.”62 Any such measures would need to reflect “the least 
disruptive means feasible to the operations of the covered critical 
infrastructure.”63 Emergency measures would expire after thirty days 
unless extended by the President, at the Director’s recommendation, for 
successive thirty-day periods.
64
 The owner or operator of the affected 
infrastructure would need to “immediately comply” with any emergency 
measures adopted by the DCP, unless and until the owner or operator 
could demonstrate to the Director that an alternative measure is feasible.
65
 
The amended version of the bill included some specific limitations on 
the Executive’s authority if an emergency is declared.66 Some of these 
limitations seem ambiguous, if not self-contradictory. For example, the 
government could not “restrict or prohibit communications carried by, or 
over, covered critical infrastructure and not specifically directed to or from 
the covered critical infrastructure unless . . . no other emergency measure 
or action will preserve” the infrastructure’s operation and mitigate 
disruption.
67
 In other words, the government could prohibit such 
communications if necessary to limit disruption. In addition, the 
 
 
 59. Id. § 3(2). 
 60. Id. § 248. 
 61. Id. § 254(c). 
 62. Id. § 249(a)(3)(B). 
 63. Id. § 249(a)(3)(C).  
 64. Id. § 249(b). 
 65. Id. § 249(c). 
 66. Id. § 249(a)(6). 
 67. Id. § 249(a)(6)(A). 
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government could prohibit any communications “specifically directed to 
or from the covered critical infrastructure.”68  
Like the proposed Cybersecurity Act of 2009, then, the PCNA would 
have delegated to the President broad authority to shut down cyberspace. 
Although the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
favorably reported the PCNA to the Senate, it was never scheduled for a 
floor vote and therefore expired.
69
 
3. The Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011 
In February 2011 Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Carper introduced 
a new bill that incorporated portions of the PCNA with some significant 
revisions and additions.
70
  
The first portion of the bill, titled the “Internet Freedom Act,” included 
a number of provisions designed to assuage the fears of cyber civil 
libertarians over prior cybersecurity bills.
71
 The Internet Freedom Act 
included a congressional finding that “computer systems of executive 
branch agencies of the Federal Government and Congress are probed or 
attacked an average of 1,800,000,000 times per month” and that “cyber 
attacks can produce $8,000,000,000 in annual losses to the national 
economy.”72 Nevertheless, it noted that “the Internet has developed into a 
robust network within the United States, with thousands of providers, 
making it technically impossible to shut down the Internet.”73 It further 
stated that “the actions of the Government must not encroach on rights 
guaranteed by the First Amendment” and that “neither the President . . . 
nor any other officer or employee of the Federal Government should have 
the authority to shut down the Internet.”74 Finally, section 2(c) made clear 
that “neither the President . . . nor any other officer or employee of the 
 
 
 68. See id. 
 69. See Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009–2010), S. 3480, THOMAS, http://Thomas 
.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03480:@@@L&summ2=m&# (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 70. Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011, S. 413, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 71. Id. § 2. 
 72. Id. § 2(b)(7)–(8). 
 73. Id. § 2(b)(4). 
 74. Id. § 2(b)(5), (10). In a statement introducing the bill, Senator Lieberman said, “We want to 
clear the air once and for all. As someone said recently, the term ‘kill switch’ has become the ‘death 
panels’ of the cybersecurity debate. There is no so-called ‘kill switch’ in our legislation because the 
very notion is antithetical to our goal of providing precise and targeted authorities to the President. 
Furthermore, it is impossible to turn off the Internet in this country.” Press Release, Sen. Joseph 
Lieberman, Lieberman, Collins, Carper Introduce Bill to Address Serious Cyber Security Threats (Feb. 
18, 2011), available at http://lieberman.senate.gov/index.cfm/news-events/news/2011/2/lieberman-collins-
carper-introduce-bill-to-address-serious-cyber-security-threats. 
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United States government shall have the authority to shut down the 
Internet.”75 
Before examining the bill’s substantive emergency provisions, it is 
useful to pause and reflect on the Orwellian quality of the “Internet 
Freedom Act.” The bill’s reassuring statement that the government must 
not encroach on the First Amendment is merely an obvious truism, which 
depends entirely on the meaning of “encroach.” More oddly, the bill stated 
that it is impossible to “shut down” the Internet, before noting that nothing 
in the bill authorizes the President to do so.
76
 Thus, the “Internet Freedom 
Act” would have assured the public that the President lacks congressional 
authorization to do the impossible. While it might be useful to know that 
Congress has not authorized the President to perform miracles, this seems 
to leave available any measure that is humanly possible. And so the 
“Internet Freedom Act,” at best, recited the truisms that executive 
authority is bound by the First Amendment and the laws of physics. 
The portions of the bill that specifically outline the President’s 
authority in the event of a cyber emergency were only slightly less open-
ended than the findings and restrictions in the “Internet Freedom Act.” 
Section 249 on “National Cyber Emergencies” adopted the basic 
framework of the PCNA: it would require private owners of critical 
information infrastructure to implement emergency response plans in 
accordance with regulations to be issued by a new executive branch 
agency, the Office of Cyberspace Policy (“OCP”).77  
As in the PCNA, the 2011 bill recited several limitations on this broad 
regulatory authority, each of which, on careful examination, were illusory. 
First, the government could not “restrict or prohibit communications 
carried by, or over, covered critical infrastructure” unless such 
communications are “specifically directed to or from the covered critical 
infrastructure” or the OCP Director “determines that no other emergency 
measure or action” will effectively respond to the emergency.78 The bill 
included no guidelines for the Director’s “determination” under this 
subsection, nor were there any provisions for public notice and comment 
or judicial review.
79
 Moreover, the “specifically directed to or from” carve 
out is potentially enormous if the infrastructure at issue comprises part of 
 
 
 75. S. 413 § 2(c). In an apparent response to backlash over the Senate committee report that 
accompanied the PCNA, this limitation extends also to section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 
1934. Id. 
 76. Id. § 2(b)(4), 2(b)(10), 2(c). 
 77. Id. §§ 101(a), 248(b)(2)(c), 249(a)(3)(A). 
 78. Id. § 249(a)(6)(A). 
 79. See generally id. § 249. 
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the Internet backbone. For example, because of how packet switching 
works, a malware attack against SCADA systems connected to the Internet 
likely would involve “communications” carried by and specifically 
directed to broad swathes of Internet backbone.
80
 
The second limitation in the bill was that the government cannot 
“control covered critical infrastructure.”81 There was no definition of the 
term “control” and no further indication of what this limitation implies. 
Moreover, the bill would have required “owners and operators of covered 
critical infrastructure” to “immediately” implement their response plans 
upon the President’s emergency declaration.82 The bill further would have 
authorized the OCP Director to implement alternative emergency 
measures if the President declares a cyber emergency.
83
 The Director 
would retain continuing discretion to review an owner or operator’s 
emergency response plans and to require alternative measures.
84
 There was 
no provision for public notice and comment or judicial review of the 
Director’s determinations.85 In other words, a private owner or operator’s 
emergency plans could be set aside in the Director’s discretion. 
With this broad discretionary authority, the Executive obviously could 
exert significant control over covered infrastructure during an 
emergency.
86
 It is true that the authority given in section 249 would not 
include the physical occupation of infrastructure facilities by police or 
military forces, and perhaps that is all the “no control” limitation covers. 
Even here, however, failure to comply could result in an uncapped civil 
penalty.
87
 Failure to comply with a court order to pay a civil penalty, of 
course, could ultimately result in forfeiture of assets and/or a sanction for 
contempt of court. At best, therefore, the “control” limitation was 
hopelessly ambiguous. 
The final set of limitations related to the authority to compel disclosure 
of information and conduct surveillance.
88
 The first stated that the 
government may not “compel the disclosure of information unless 
specifically authorized by law.”89 The second clarified that the bill 
 
 
 80. See, e.g., CLARKE & KNAKE, supra note 26. 
 81. S. 413 § 249(a)(6)(B). 
 82. Id. § 249(a)(3)(A). 
 83. Id. § 249(c)(1). 
 84. Id. § 249(c)(2). 
 85. See generally id. § 249. 
 86. See id. § 249(a)(3)(A). 
 87. Id. § 250(c)(1).  
 88. Id. § 249(a)(6)(C)–(D). 
 89. Id. § 249(a)(6)(C). 
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provided no surveillance or wiretap authority outside that which already 
exists under current law, including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act of 1978 (FISA).
90
 This surveillance and wiretap limitation seems 
chimerical in light of the broad authorities that already exist under FISA.
91
 
The information disclosure limitation was toothless because emergency 
security measures certainly would have included information reporting 
and auditing requirements authorized by the same law that includes this 
exception.
92
 Section 250 of the bill, for example, would have required all 
owners and operators of covered critical infrastructure to submit a 
“certificate of compliance” with required security measures, subject to the 
Director’s audit of “all documentation submitted” in support of the 
certificate, including a “a physical or electronic inspection of relevant 
information infrastructure” covered by the certificate.93 Once again, these 
provisions at best seem to preclude only a large scale military or police 
seizure of information infrastructure facilities and data. 
Any entity that violates the reporting and compliance requirements 
would be subject to an unspecified civil penalty.
94
 The bill 
providedlimitations of civil liability for claims relating to cyber 
emergencies if the covered entity has complied with its emergency 
response obligations.
95
 
An area in which the bill did provide substantial limitations not in the 
PCNA related to the duration of a state of cyber emergency. A declaration 
of cyber emergency would be effective for up to thirty days and could be 
extended for up to three additional thirty-day periods.
96
 Subsequently, the 
state of cyber emergency could be continued only upon a joint resolution 
of Congress.
97
 The PCNA, in contrast, would have permitted successive 
extensions by the Executive without further congressional oversight.
98
 
Another way in which the bill differed from the PCNA is in the 
procedure for designating what comprises “critical information 
infrastructure,” thereby triggering compliance obligations. The Secretary 
of Homeland Security would have been tasked with creating a list of 
 
 
 90. Id. § 249(a)(6)(D). 
 91. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 92. See, e.g., S. 413 § 250(a) (reporting), 250(b) (audit). 
 93. Id. § 250(a)(1), 250(b)(2)(A)–(B). 
 94. Id. § 250(c)(1). 
 95. Id. § 250(d)(2). 
 96. Id. § 249(b)(2). 
 97. Id. 
 98. See S. 3480, 111th Cong. § 249(b) (as reported by S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. & 
Governmental Affairs, Dec. 15, 2010). 
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critical information infrastructure resources, based on a variety of factors, 
including the extent of disruption, harm to the economy, and potential for 
mass casualties if the resource is compromised.
99
 An owner or operator 
could appeal a designation in federal court in accordance with the 
Administrative Procedure Act.
100
 This was the only specific provision for 
judicial review of any action by the Executive in the bill. This section of 
the bill also provided a mechanism for owners or operators to request that 
a system or asset under their control be designated as critical information 
infrastructure.
101
 A determination made under this procedure would be 
unreviewable, not subject to any judicial review or other appeal.
102
 
Coupled with the limitations on civil liability under section 250, this 
provision would have offered a strong incentive to owners and operators to 
list themselves voluntarily. It is likely, for example, that large Internet 
backbone providers would list themselves in order to take advantage of the 
section 250 limitations on liability, thereby exempting these 
determinations even from the limited judicial review under the APA for 
involuntary designations. 
4. The Cybersecurity Act of 2012  
On February 14, 2012, Senators Lieberman, Collins, and Carper 
introduced yet another comprehensive cybersecurity proposal to replace 
the PCNA and the Cybersecurity and Internet Freedom Act of 2011—the 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012.
103
 This bill does not contain any explicit 
authorization for the Executive to declare a cyber emergency. Supporters 
of the bill suggest that any potential “kill switch” language has been 
removed.
104
 
However, section 109 would establish a procedure for “emergency 
planning,” whereby the Secretary of Homeland Security would be 
authorized to create “response and restoration plans” with respect to 
critical infrastructure.
105
 Such plans would empower the Secretary to 
“clarify specific roles, responsibilities, and authorities of government and 
 
 
 99. S. 413 §§ 502(a)(2)(B), 248(a)(2). 
 100. Id. § 254(c). 
 101. Id. § 254(d)(1)(A). 
 102. Id. § 254(d)(2). 
 103. S. 2105, 112th Cong. (as introduced, Feb. 14, 2012). 
 104. 158 CONG. REC. S617 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman) (“One 
myth about this bill is that it contains a kill switch that would allow the President of the United States 
in an emergency to seize control of the Internet. There is nothing remotely like that in this bill.”). 
 105. S. 2105 § 109. 
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private sector entities when responding to a major cyber incident.”106 This 
section cross-references section 105(b) of the bill, which would authorize 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to enact regulations governing the 
cybersecurity compliance of owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure.
107
  
It appears, then, that the question of Executive authority over the 
Internet in the event of a cyber emergency would, if this bill were adopted, 
remain a live question for the regulatory process. It might even make the 
problem more intractable since the bill provides no substantive guidance 
or limitations for any resulting regulations. In colloquial terms, it punts. In 
his floor comments in support of the bill, Senator Lieberman noted that 
“[a]t one time we had considered language that would, in fact, have 
limited powers the President has under the Communications Act of 1934 
to take over electronic communications in times of war.”108 This narrowly 
defined presidential emergency power, he said, “was so widely 
misunderstood or misrepresented that we dropped it rather than risk losing 
the chance to pass the rest of this urgently needed legislation.”109 Given 
this belief of the bill’s sponsors, and the language of the prior bills, the 
prospect of an open-ended rulemaking under the auspices of the 
Department of Homeland Security seems less than sanguine. 
The ongoing debate over cybersecurity bills in Congress, therefore, 
demonstrates that problem of emergency executive authority in cyberspace 
remains intractable. Part III seeks to place this debate into a broader 
context by exploring the scope of presidential power in times of national 
emergency and specifically in relation to public safety and the Internet. 
III. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND CYBER EMERGENCIES 
This Part explores the current scope of executive power in the event of 
a cyber emergency. It first examines inherent presidential powers under 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution. It then considers the principles of 
 
 
 106. Id. § 109(a)(2). 
 107. Id. § 105. The regulatory process envisioned in this section is a collaborative public-private 
model. Id. § 105(a). 
 108. 158 CONG. REC. S617 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman); see 
also Senator Joeseph Lieberman, Introduction of Cybersecurity Act of 2012 (Feb. 14, 2012), available 
at http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/download/senator-liebermans-statement-on-introduction-of-the-cyber 
security-act-of-2012 (“At one time we had considered language that would have limited sweeping 
powers we believe the President already has under the ‘Communications Act of 1934’ to commandeer 
all electronic communications in times of war. It would have narrowly defined the President’s 
authority, not given him unbridled power.”). 
 109. 158 CONG. REC. S617 (daily ed. Feb. 14, 2012) (statement of Sen. Joseph Lieberman). 
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delegated powers and examines aspects of communications and 
cybersecurity policy over which Congress has already delegated some 
degree of power to the Executive. This analysis will move a significant 
way towards a conclusion about the President’s authority to shut down the 
Internet during a cyber emergency. This Article will also consider some 
occasions in which Congress has sought to regulate cybersecurity directly, 
in order to discern the Supreme Court’s attitude towards civil liberties in 
cyberspace. That consideration is the subject of the subsequent Part. 
A. Inherent Presidential Powers  
The President possesses broad powers in times of war and national 
emergency, though the extent of constitutional restraints on those powers 
remains hotly debated.
110
 The exercise of such inherent powers obviously 
raises separation of powers concerns. Such concerns are heightened when 
the President’s exercise of war powers impinges on private property and 
rights of privacy. Because efforts to secure the national information grid 
necessarily implicate property and privacy rights, any such action should 
be subject to careful constitutional scrutiny.  
The seminal case is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.
111
 In 
1951, in the midst of a labor dispute, President Truman issued an 
executive order directing the Secretary of Commerce to take over most the 
steel mills in the United States.
112
 The President argued that he possessed 
inherent power to order the seizure because steel production was vital to 
national security, particularly in light of the Korean War effort.
113
  
The Court held that the seizure exceeded presidential power under the 
Constitution.
114
 Writing for the majority, Justice Black stated that, even if 
the President possesses some powers as Commander in Chief of the 
Armed Forces, “we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system 
hold that [the President] has the ultimate power as such to take possession 
of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping 
 
 
 110. See, e.g., Mark E. Brandon, War and the American Constitutional Order, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 11 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005); 
Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME: 
BEYOND ALARMISM AND COMPLACENCY 39 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005). 
 111. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 112. Id. at 583. 
 113. Id. at 583–84. 
 114. Id. at 586–89. 
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production. This is a job for the Nation’s lawmakers, not for its military 
authorities.”115 
In an often quoted and wide ranging concurring opinion, Justice 
Jackson offered three categories of presidential power: (1) “maximum” 
legitimacy, when the President acts under express authorization from 
Congress; (2) a “zone of twilight,” when the President “acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority”; and (3) the “lowest 
ebb,” when the President “takes measures incompatible with the expressed 
or implied will of Congress.”116 According to Justice Jackson, presidential 
actions in the first category are entitled to judicial deference, unless the 
underlying statute is unconstitutional.
117
 Actions in the third category 
“must be scrutinized with caution,” and should be upheld only if the 
Constitution expressly delegates authority to the President.
118
 As to the 
second category’s “zone of twilight,” Justice Jackson stated, “any actual 
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law.”119  
The steel seizure order, Justice Jackson argued, was unjustified under 
each category.
120
 President Truman admittedly acted without express 
congressional authority, and his actions were in fact inconsistent with 
several existing statutes, eliminating the first and second categories.
121
 As 
to the third category, Justice Jackson wrote at length about the dangers of 
executive control over civilian industries and other liberties even during 
wartime. “[T]he Constitution did not contemplate,” he stated, “that the title 
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy will constitute him also 
Commander in Chief of the country, its industries and its inhabitants.”122 
Nevertheless, Justice Jackson left open the possibility that the President 
might exercise such power under exigent circumstances:  
The present situation is not comparable to that of an imminent 
invasion or threatened attack. We do not face the issue of what 
might be the President’s constitutional power to meet such 
catastrophic situations. Nor is it claimed that the current seizure is 
in the nature of a military command addressed by the President, as 
 
 
 115. Id. at 587. 
 116. Id. at 635–38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 117. Id. at 635–37. 
 118. Id. at 637–38. 
 119. Id. at 637.  
 120. Id. at 638–55. 
 121. Id. at 638–39.  
 122. Id. at 643–44 (emphasis removed). 
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Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation waging, or imminently 
threatened with, total war.
123
 
Because the nation was not engaged in total war and Congress had 
specified procedures for property seizures under ordinary circumstances, 
the steel seizure order exceeded presidential power.
124
 
Justice Jackson’s framework in Youngstown has gained special 
importance in response to the Bush Administration’s assertions of 
executive authority while prosecuting the War on Terror.
125
 In recent 
years, the assertion of presidential power reached its constitutional apogee 
in the “Torture Opinion” drafted by the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel.
126
 That opinion infamously argued that “Congress may no 
more regulate the President’s ability to detain and interrogate enemy 
combatants than it may regulate his ability to direct troop movements on 
the battlefield.”127 It set off a press and academic firestorm, although no 
one was prosecuted for any actions taken in accordance with its advice.
128
 
This backlash was perhaps reflected in the Supreme Court’s recent 
disposition of a case touching on inherent presidential powers, Medellin v. 
Texas.
129
 A group of Mexican nationals had been convicted of crimes in 
state courts in the United States.
130
 The International Court of Justice 
determined in Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals that 
these defendants were entitled to have their cases reconsidered due to 
violations of the Vienna Convention, even though the defendants failed to 
raise Vienna Convention claims in the state courts.
131
 The Supreme Court 
subsequently held in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, a case involving different 
 
 
 123. Id. at 659. 
 124. Id. at 660. 
 125. See Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on 
Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007) (detailing the assertion of executive power during 
President Bush’s prosecution of the War on Terror); Edward T. Swaine, The Political Economy of 
Youngstown, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 263, 266 (2010) (noting, with respect to the renewed judicial and 
political interest in Justice Jackson’s framework, “[w]hat a difference a war makes—especially an 
unpopular one”). 
 126. See Johnsen, supra note 125, at 1566–73. 
 127. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto 
R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2340–2340A 35 (Aug. 1, 2002), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/ 
documents/cheney/torture_memo_aug2002.pdf; see also Memorandum from John C. Yoo, Deputy 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel, Dep’t of Def., 
Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants Held Outside the United States 13 (Mar. 14, 
2003), available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/safefree/yoo_army_torture_memo.pdf. 
 128. See Johnsen, supra note 125, at 1567–68. 
 129. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
 130. Id. at 497–98. 
 131. Id. 
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defendants from those invoved in Avena, that the Vienna Convention did 
not bar “application of state default rules.”132 President Bush then issued a 
Memorandum to the Attorney General stating that the state courts should 
give effect to the Avena ruling.
133
 In other words, the President directed 
that the Avena defendants could raise their Vienna Convention arguments 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s Sanchez-Llamas opinion. Defendant 
Medellin appealed when the Texas courts refused to grant his application 
for a writ of habeas corpus.
134
 
Medellin argued that the President’s Memorandum rendered the ICJ’s 
Avena decision binding in U.S. courts regardless of whether the Vienna 
Convention itself preempted state law.
135
 The Court rejected this 
argument.
136
 Citing “first principles” of limitations on presidential power, 
the Court noted that “Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite scheme provides 
the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”137 
The Court concluded that neither the relevant treaties themselves nor the 
President’s inherent foreign affairs powers authorized him to override state 
law in this instance.
138
 Although Medellin is not a cybersecurity or War on 
Terror case, it suggests that the Court is perhaps becoming more sensitive 
to the limits of presidential power. 
B. Delegated Powers and the Nondelegation Doctrine 
Justice Jackson’s first category of maximum legitimacy assumes that 
Congress may authorize the President to take certain actions. But what if 
Congress cedes Article I legislative powers to the President? The U.S. 
Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”139 Congress may not 
delegate its legislative powers to other branches of government.
140
 The 
 
 
 132. Id. at 498 (citing Sanchez–Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006)). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 523. The Court rejected Medellin’s primary argument that the Vienna Convention did 
preempt state law. Id. at 504–23. 
 136. Id. at 523–32. 
 137. Id. at 524. 
 138. Id. at 523–32. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, Justice Breyer 
argued that the Vienna Convention preempted state law under the Supremacy Clause. Id. at 538–64 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer also concluded that the President’s authority to implement U.S. 
obligations under the ICJ’s Avena decision fell into the “middle range” of Justice Jackson’s rubric. Id. 
at 564. Because the President’s decision involved difficult foreign affairs policy questions, he stated, it 
should have been upheld. Id. at 565–66. 
 139. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 140. See generally Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
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Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he nondelegation doctrine is rooted in 
the principle of separation of powers that underlies our tripartite system of 
Government.”141 Any congressional authorization or delegation to the 
Executive therefore must satisfy the “nondelegation” doctrine. 
The touchstone for nondelegation analysis is the “intelligible principle” 
test articulated by Justice Taft in Hampton & Co. v. United States: “If 
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to 
which the person or body authorized . . . is directed to conform, such 
legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”142 
The “intelligible principle” standard is quite broad. The Supreme Court 
has observed that “in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever 
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.”143  
In fact, the Supreme Court has invalidated only two statutes for want of 
an intelligible principle for the exercise of executive discretion.
144
 Both of 
these were New Deal cases decided in 1935—what Cass R. Sunstein has 
called the nondelegation doctrine’s “one good year.”145 In Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan,
146
 the Court evaluated the “Petroleum Code,” an 
executive order that allocated oil production quotas among the States. The 
executive order was issued pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (“NIRA”), a New Deal statute that authorized the President to issue 
trade standards for various key aspects of the economy.
147
 The NIRA was 
enacted in response to a “national emergency”—the Great Depression.148 
The Court first surveyed a variety of early precedents in which some 
delegation of rule-making authority to the Executive was upheld.
149
 The 
Court derived from these cases a principle that the delegating statute must 
include some standards to constrain executive discretion.
150
 Concerning oil 
production quotas, the Court noted, the NIRA “has declared no policy, has 
 
 
 141. Id. at 371. 
 142. 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (upholding congressional delegation of authority to the President to 
adjust import tariffs). 
 143. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372. 
 144. Whitman v. Am Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (noting that “[i]n the history of 
the Court we have found the requisite ‘intelligible principle’ lacking in only two statutes” (citing 
Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935))). 
 145. Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000). 
 146. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 147. Id. at 405–06. 
 148. Id. at 416–17. 
 149. Id. at 422–30. 
 150. Id. at 429–30. 
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established no standard, has laid down no rule.”151 The Court therefore 
directed the lower court to issue a permanent injunction against 
enforcement of the Petroleum Code.
152
 
In A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, issued in the same 
year as Panama Refining, the Court examined the constitutionality of the 
“Live Poultry Code,” which was promulgated by President Roosevelt 
under NIRA.
153
 The NIRA authorized the President to approve “codes of 
fair competition” upon application by a trade or industry group or upon his 
own initiative.
154
 Before approving a code, the President was required to 
find that the proposed code imposed no inequitable membership 
requirements and was not designed to promote monopolies.
155
 The “Live 
Poultry Code” included wage, hour, and age regulations for poultry 
industry employees, and proscribed various unfair trade practices.
156
 
The Court invalidated NIRA’s delegation of authority to the President 
because the Act itself supplied no standards or rules of conduct for the 
regulated industry.
157
 According to the Court, under NIRA, “the discretion 
of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws 
for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is 
virtually unfettered.”158 
C. Nondelegation and the War on Terror 
Hampton and Schechter Poultry were the last and only cases in which 
the Supreme Court invalidated a statute or rule under the nondelegation 
doctrine. Even in historical context, these cases caused a political uproar 
over the Supreme Court’s supervision of—or interference with, depending 
on political viewpoint—the New Deal.159 The New Deal subsequently 
proceeded unhindered by judicial application of nondelegation principles. 
And the doctrine has fared no better in recent years, particularly in 
connection with national security and foreign relations issues. For 
example, lower courts and the Supreme Court have recently addressed 
nondelegation doctrine principles in the post-September 11 antiterrorism 
 
 
 151. Id. at 430. 
 152. Id. at 433. 
 153. 295 U.S. 495, 520–21 (1935). 
 154. Id. at 521–22. 
 155. Id. at 522. 
 156. Id. at 523–24. 
 157. Id. at 541–42. 
 158. Id. at 542. 
 159. See Sunstein, supra note 145, at 317–21, 326–28. 
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context. The issue surfaced somewhat obliquely in one of the seminal War 
on Terror precedents, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.
160
 In Hamdi, the Court reviewed 
the detention of an American citizen, without recourse to habeas corpus or 
other judicial procedures, at military facilities at Guantanamo Bay, 
Virginia, and South Carolina.
161
 The Court held that citizen-detainees who 
seek to challenge their status as enemy combatants must receive notice and 
an opportunity to be heard before a neutral decision-maker.
162
 En route to 
this holding, the Court addressed as a threshold question “whether the 
Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as ‘enemy 
combatants.’”163  
A plurality led by Justice O’Connor found it unnecessary to address 
whether the President possessed plenary authority for these detentions 
under Article II of the Constitution.
164
 The plurality located an express 
delegation of authority in the Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(“AUMF”) issued by Congress the week after the September 11 attacks.165 
The AUMF authorized the President to “use all necessary and 
appropriate force” against “nations, organizations or persons” that the 
President determined “planned, authorized, committed, or aided” the 
September 11 attacks.
166
 The plurality stated that detention of enemy 
combatants “for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were 
captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to war” that it fell 
squarely within the “necessary and appropriate force” authorized under the 
AUMF.
167
 The AUMF’s “necessary and appropriate force” language, the 
plurality noted, constituted “explicit congressional authorization” for the 
detention of enemy combatants.
168
  
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, concurred in the result but 
disagreed with the plurality’s reasoning concerning the AUMF.169 Justice 
Souter believed the true threshold issue was whether the AUMF was an 
 
 
 160. 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 161. Id. at 510–11. Hamdi was captured in Afghanistan while allegedly working for the Taliban. 
Id. at 510. 
 162. Id. at 533. 
 163. Id. at 516. 
 164. Id. at 517–25. Justice O’Connor’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices 
Kennedy and Breyer. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
 167. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518 (plurality opinion). 
 168. Id. at 517. 
 169. Id. at 539–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
820 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:795 
 
 
 
 
“act of Congress” under the Non-Detention Act.170 The Non-Detention 
Act, Justice Souter noted, was adopted in the wake of the Japanese 
internment camps during World War II.
171
 The purpose of the Non-
Detention Act, according to Justice Souter, was to “preclude reliance on 
vague congressional authority . . . as authority for detention or 
imprisonment at the discretion of the Executive . . . .”172 For Justice 
Souter, then, the AUMF lacked the clarity and specificity required by the 
Non-Detention Act.
173
 Nevertheless, he joined in the Court’s judgment that 
Hamdi should be afforded a hearing on whether he was an enemy 
combatant.
174
 
Justices Scalia and Stevens dissented because they believed “the 
Executive’s assertion of military exigency” is never “sufficient to permit 
detention without charge” absent invocation of the Constitution’s 
Suspension Clause by Congress.
175
 According to Justice Scalia,  
Many think it not only inevitable but entirely proper that liberty 
give way to security in times of national crisis—that, at the 
extremes of military exigency, inter arma silent leges. Whatever the 
general merits of the view that war silences law or modulates its 
voice, that view has no place in the interpretation and application of 
a Constitution designed precisely to confront war and, in a manner 
that accords with democratic principles, to accommodate it.
176
 
Justice Thomas, in contrast, dissented because he believed that 
Hamdi’s detention “falls squarely within the Federal Government’s war 
powers.”177 In ordering Hamdi’s detention, the President, Justice Thomas 
concluded, acted both within the scope of his inherent Article II powers as 
Commander in Chief, and pursuant to a proper delegation of authority by 
Congress under the AUMF.
178
 In the domains of foreign policy and 
national security, Justice Thomas stated, “the fact that Congress has 
provided the President with broad authorities does not imply—and the 
 
 
 170. Id. at 542. Under the Non-Detention Act, “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise 
detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.” 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2006). 
 171. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 542–43 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring 
in the judgment). 
 172. Id. at 543–44. 
 173. Id. at 551. 
 174. Id. at 553.  
 175. Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 579. 
 177. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 178. Id. at 580–99.  
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Judicial Branch should not infer—that Congress intended to deprive him 
of particular powers not specifically enumerated.”179 
Hamdi, then, while not specifically a “nondelegation doctrine” case, is 
an important contemporary source concerning the fraught tensions 
between individual constitutional rights and the powers of Congress and 
the Executive in the War on Terror context. 
Some lower courts have addressed more explicit nondelegation 
challenges to War on Terror activities. In United States v. Hammoud, the 
Fourth Circuit considered a challenge to defendant Hammoud’s conviction 
of providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization.
180
 
Hammoud provided support to Hizballah, which had been designated as a 
foreign terrorist organization (“FTO”) by the Secretary of State pursuant to 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
181
 Among a 
panoply of constitutional and procedural arguments, Hammoud argued 
that the Secretary of State’s designation of Hizballah as an FTO violated 
the nondelegation doctrine.
182
 The court quickly disposed of this argument 
because, among other things, an FTO designation is subject to judicial 
review if challenged by the designated organization.
183
 
In Owens v. Republic of Sudan, the plaintiffs sued the Republic of 
Sudan for injuries sustained in the 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania.
184
 The suit was brought under the state sponsor of 
terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.
185
 Under 
this exception, a foreign sovereign designated by the Secretary of State as 
a state sponsor of terrorism lost sovereign immunity for claims arising out 
of acts of terrorism supported by an official, agent, or employee of the 
state.
186
 The defendant claimed that the statutory exception improperly 
delegated to the Executive broad authority to invoke the jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts over foreign states.
187
 
The court noted that “[a] statute that delegates factfinding [sic] 
decisions to the President which rely on his foreign relations powers is less 
susceptible to attack on nondelegation grounds than one delegating a 
 
 
 179. Id. at 583. 
 180. 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005), reinstated on 
remand, 405 F.3d 1034 (4th Cir. 2005) (en banc). The original conviction was vacated because of an 
issue concerning the application of mandatory sentencing guidelines. See Hammoud, 405 F.3d at 1034. 
 181. Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 325–27 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (West 2000 & Supp. 2004)). 
 182. Id. at 331. 
 183. Id. 
 184. 531 F.3d 884, 886 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 887–88 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (2006)). 
 187. Id. at 888. 
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power over which the President has less or no inherent Constitutional 
authority.”188 The state sponsor of terrorism exception, the court stated, 
merely delegates to the Executive a fact-finding function well within its 
authority and expertise—the determination whether a particular foreign 
state is, in fact, sponsoring terrorism.
189
 Moreover, the statutory definitions 
of “terrorism” and “international terrorism” provided sufficiently detailed 
parameters for guiding this determination.
190
 Therefore, the court rejected 
the nondelegation challenge.
191
 
D. Nondelegation, Government Power, and FISA 
The post-September 11 torture memos were not the only aspect of the 
War on Terror that provoked deep concerns about the scope of presidential 
power in times of emergency.
192
 A second key problem, with direct links 
to cybersecurity, was the President’s authority to conduct surveillance in 
the United States. 
The Bush Administration pressed its post-September 11 surveillance 
agenda, in part, through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(“FISA”) and amendments to FISA under the Patriot Act.193 The ensuing 
legal challenges were not cast as nondelegation doctrine issues, but the 
constitutional questions raised relate to the Executive’s authority to 
monitor and regulate conduct on the Internet, and therefore raise related 
constitutional concerns. 
FISA governs electronic foreign intelligence surveillance by the federal 
government.
194
 FISA states that “the President, through the Attorney 
General, may authorize electronic surveillance without a court order . . . 
for periods of up to one year.”195 Such surveillance must relate to 
“communications transmitted by means of communications used 
exclusively between or among foreign powers” or “technical intelligence 
. . . from property or premises under the open and exclusive control of a 
foreign power.”196 “Minimization procedures” must be adopted to ensure 
that no communications involving a U.S. person are intercepted.
197
 
 
 
 188. Id. at 891. 
 189. Id. at 892–93. 
 190. Id. at 893 (citing 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(1)–(2) (2006)). 
 191. Id. 
 192. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text. 
 193. See 50 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Id. § 1802(a)(1). 
 196. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A). 
 197. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(C); see also id. § 1801(i) (defining “United States person”). 
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FISA also empowers the President to authorize the Attorney General to 
apply for court orders to conduct surveillance of communications between 
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power and a U.S. citizen.
198
 Such 
requests must be directed to a secret court comprised of sitting federal 
judges (“FISA court”).199 In support of an application for a surveillance 
order, the government must provide details of the proposed surveillance 
and certify that “a significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain 
foreign intelligence information.”200 Denials of such applications are 
subject to review by a special three-judge review court (“Court of 
Review”).201 
The “significant purpose” requirement was tested in the first opinion of 
the Court of Review, which remains one of the court’s few published 
opinions, In re Sealed Case.
202
 As discussed in Sealed Case, the 
“significant purpose” language was part of the Patriot Act’s post-
September 11 amendments to FISA.
203
 FISA had previously required that 
“‘the purpose’ of the surveillance [was] to obtain foreign intelligence 
information.”204 Courts and the Department of Justice interpreted this to 
mean that FISA’s requirements were not satisfied if the “primary purpose” 
of a FISA order was to gather evidence of a crime.
205
 This contributed to 
the infamous “wall” between the FBI and the intelligence agencies, one of 
the key government communications breakdowns that facilitated the 
September 11 attacks.
206
  
After the Patriot Act amendments to FISA, an interpretive difference 
arose between the Attorney General and the FISA court. The Attorney 
General understood the amended FISA to permit free information sharing 
between governmental intelligence and criminal functions—to break down 
completely the pre-September 11 “wall.”207 The FISA court, in contrast, 
required minimization procedures for all surveillance orders that 
 
 
 198. Id. § 1802(b). 
 199. Id. § 1803(a)(1), (c).  
 200. Id. § 1804(a)(6)(B). 
 201. Id. § 1803(b). 
 202. 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
 203. Id. at 728–29. 
 204. Id. at 723 (emphasis added). 
 205. Id. at 725–27. 
 206. This is dramatically illustrated in the 9/11 Commission Report by the email of a frustrated 
FBI agent who was attempting to get information on Osama bin Laden’s activities and was denied 
access because of the criminal/intelligence “wall”: “Whatever has happened to this—someday 
someone will die—and wall or not—the public will not understand why we were not more effective 
and throwing every resource we had at certain ‘problems.’” NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 
UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 271 (2004). 
 207. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 729–30. 
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essentially reinstated the pre-September 11 Justice Department “wall” 
policies.
208
 
The Court of Review held that “the FISA court erred” by requiring 
these procedures.
209
 The Patriot Act amendments to FISA, the Court of 
Review held, were adopted specifically to minimize such distinctions.
210
 
So long as the government “articulates a broader objective than criminal 
prosecution,” the statutory test is satisfied.211 
The Court of Review then addressed whether the amended FISA 
violates the Fourth Amendment.
212
 The concern raised by the ACLU was 
that, absent the “wall” procedures, a FISA order could be used as a 
substitute for a warrant required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control 
and Safe Streets Act of 1968.
213
 The most significant difference between a 
Title III warrant and FISA order requirements, the Court of Review noted, 
is the standard for probable cause.
214
  
A Title III warrant requires a showing that “‘there is probable cause for 
belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to 
commit’” a crime.215 FISA requires only a showing “that the target is a 
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”216 However, the Court of 
Review noted that for a U.S. person to be considered an “agent of a 
foreign power” under FISA, that person must be engaged in some criminal 
activity on behalf of a foreign power.
217
 Therefore, the court concluded, 
“FISA applies only to certain carefully delineated, and particularly serious, 
foreign threats to national security.”218 Moreover, the court believed that 
the particularity, necessity, duration, and minimization provisions in FISA, 
though in some instances less rigorous than Title III’s warrant 
requirements, satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s basic reasonableness 
test.
219
 
 
 
 208. Id. at 730. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. at 732–36. The Court of Review concluded that “the Patriot Act amendment, by using the 
word ‘significant,’ eliminated any justification for the FISA court to balance the relative weight the 
government places on criminal prosecution as compared to other counterintelligence responses.” Id. at 
735. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 736–42. 
 213. Id. at 737. 
 214. Id. at 737–40. 
 215. Id. at 738 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2000)). 
 216. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at 739. 
 219. Id. at 739–42. 
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The post-Patriot Act FISA survived a second constitutional challenge 
before the Court of Review in 2008.
220
 In In re Directives, the Court of 
Review examined a Patriot Act amendment to FISA that permitted that 
acquisition of foreign intelligence surveillance information concerning 
persons “‘reasonably believed’ to be located outside of the United 
States.”221 Pursuant to this provision, the government directed a 
communication service provider to assist with warrantless surveillance of 
some of its customers.
222
 The service provider contested the validity of 
those directives.
223
 
The Court of Review first found that the service provider had standing 
to challenge the directives.
224
 The court noted that the service provider 
“faces an injury in the nature of the burden that it must shoulder to 
facilitate the government’s surveillances of its customers . . . .”225 
However, the court rejected the service provider’s constitutional 
challenge under the Fourth Amendment’s warrant clause.226 The Court of 
Review held that there is a “foreign intelligence exception” to the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement.227 Although the Supreme Court has 
not expressly recognized this exception, the Court of Review reasoned, it 
is available under the Court’s “special needs” category of exceptions, 
which include drug testing and other public safety contexts.
228
  
Consistent with its decision in In re Sealed Case, the Court of Review 
further held that to satisfy the “foreign intelligence” exception to the 
warrant requirement, the government need not show that the “primary 
purpose” of the surveillance is to gather foreign intelligence 
information.
229
 Instead, the Court of Review held, “the more appropriate 
consideration is the programmatic purpose of the surveillances and 
 
 
 220. In re Directives [redacted text] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008). 
 221. Id. at 1006–07 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1805(b)(a)). The provision at issue expired pursuant to a 
sunset provision on February 16, 2008, and was not renewed. Id. at 1006 n.1. The identity of the 
service provider that challenged the directives is redacted in the public version of the decision. 
 222. Id. at 1007. 
 223. Id. at 1008. 
 224. Id. at 1008–09.  
 225. Id. at 1008. 
 226. Id. at 1009–16. The court quickly disposed of the service provider’s facial challenge because 
the statute had in fact been applied in the context of the specific directives issued to the service 
provider. Id. at 1009–10. 
 227. Id. at 1010–12. 
 228. Id. at 1010–11. 
 229. Id. at 1011.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
826 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 89:795 
 
 
 
 
whether—as in the special needs cases—that programmatic purpose 
involves some legitimate objective beyond ordinary crime control.”230 
The Court of Review then examined the relevant government interest 
against the Fourth Amendment right to freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures under a “totality of the circumstances” test.231 The 
“interest in national security,” the court stated, “is of the highest order of 
magnitude.”232 The court rejected the petitioner’s argument that the 
directives at issue lacked the sorts of safeguards—particularly, 
minimization procedures, targeting procedures, and judicial review—
deemed important in In re Sealed Case.
233
 As applied, the court held, the 
directives included reasonable safeguards, although most of the details 
about those procedures were redacted from the published opinion.
234
 
In short, the courts thus far have upheld extensive warrantless cyber-
surveillance under the amended FISA procedures. 
E. Nondelegation and NSA Security Letters 
The Bush Administration’s surveillance agenda did not stop with FISA 
procedures. One of the most controversial aspects of the response to the 
September 11 attacks was President Bush’s secret authorization to the 
National Security Agency (“NSA”) to intercept international electronic 
communications between persons in the United States, including U.S. 
citizens, and suspected terrorists.
235
 This secret surveillance was conducted 
without any warrant, FISA order, or other judicial oversight.
236
  
When the NSA wiretap program was uncovered, it prompted a public 
outcry.
237
 A coalition of constitutional law scholars and government 
officials, for example, argued to Congress that the Administration’s 
position contradicted FISA’s provision for wartime domestic electronic 
surveillance for a limited fifteen-day period and that Congress did not 
implicitly authorize domestic surveillance through the AUMF.
238
  
 
 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. at 1012. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 1013. 
 234. Id. at 1013–14. 
 235. See Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Att’y Gen., to Sen. Pat Roberts, Chairman, 
Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence et al. (Dec. 22, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
readingroom/surveillance6.pdf. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/16program .html. 
 238. Letter from Curtis A. Bradley, Richard & Marcy Horvitz Professor of Law, Duke Univ. et al. 
to Sen. Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. Senate et al. (Jan. 9, 2006), available at http://epic.org/ 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] CYBERSECURITY AND EXECUTIVE POWER 827 
 
 
 
 
In response to these objections, the President grounded his power to 
conduct surveillance in his inherent authority as Commander in Chief, 
under Article II of the Constitution, to obtain signals intelligence, as 
supplemented by Congress’ September 18, 2001 AUMF.239 The Bush 
Administration reasoned that “[c]ommunications intelligence targeted at 
the enemy is a fundamental incident of the use of military force.”240 The 
Administration argued that the FISA procedures were not required because 
FISA expressly exempts from its provisions electronic surveillance 
otherwise “authorized by statute” and that the AUMF satisfied this 
exception.
241
 Finally, the Administration claimed that the “special needs” 
exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement includes 
“[f]oreign intelligence collection, especially in the midst of an armed 
conflict in which the adversary has already launched catastrophic attacks 
within the United States . . . .”242 
The Electronic Frontier Foundation filed a class action lawsuit alleging 
privacy violations and other claims against telecommunications providers 
that allegedly cooperated with the NSA wiretap program.
243
 Evidence 
submitted during the litigation suggested that the government had 
established a mirror site at a major Internet routing hub, which was 
capable of siphoning and reviewing enormous volumes of Internet 
traffic.
244
 
The case was dismissed on the pleadings in the Northern District of 
California by District Judge Vaughn Walker.
245
 Judge Walker held that 
FISA’s immunity provision for service providers barred the plaintiffs’ 
claims.
246
  
 
 
privacy/terrorism/fisa/dojreply.pdf. 
 239. Letter from William E. Moschella, supra note 235, at 2–3. 
 240. Id. at 3. 
 241. Id. at 3–4. 
 242. Id. at 4. 
 243. Amended Complaint for Damages, Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Hepting v. AT&T 
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-VRW), available at http://www.eff.org/ 
files/filenode/att/att_complaint_amended.pdf; see also Letter from Cindy A. Cohn, Elec. Frontier 
Found., to Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy & Commerce et al. (Oct. 12, 
2007), available at http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/FISA/committee_letter.pdf. 
 244. See Declaration of Mark Klein in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction, 
Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2006) (No. C-06-0672-VRW), available at 
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/Mark%20Klein%20Unredacted%20Decl-Including%20Exhibits .PDF. 
 245. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Record Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2009), 
aff’d,2011 WL 6823154 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 246. Id. at 955. 
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FISA’s immunity provision was adopted specifically in response to the 
lawsuits filed after the public disclosure of the NSA wiretap program.
247
 
As Judge Walker noted, the immunity provision “creates a retroactive 
immunity for past, completed acts committed by private parties acting in 
concert with governmental entities that allegedly violated constitutional 
rights.”248 In order for immunity to apply, the executive branch, through 
the Attorney General, must certify that the statutory conditions for 
immunity have been met.
249
 
The court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that this amounted to a 
legislatively mandated factual finding in violation of separation of powers 
principles.
250
 Instead, the court held, it was merely an amendment to the 
law while litigation was pending, which is well within Congress’s remit.251 
The court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the certification 
requirement violated the nondelgation doctrine.
252
 Judge Walker wrestled 
with the lack of an explicit charge from Congress to the Attorney General 
concerning which defendants should benefit from immunity.
253
 The lack of 
such an express charge vests a substantial amount of discretion in the 
executive branch.
254
 However, although Judge Walker considered this a 
“close question,” he held that the statute could be construed in a way that 
preserves its constitutionality.
255
 The immunity provision’s legislative 
history and the “national security” context of the NSA program suggested 
to Judge Walker that Congress expected the Attorney General to approve 
immunity in most if not all cases pending against telecommunications 
companies, and this on balance provided enough direction.
256
 
Judge Walker also disagreed with the plaintiffs’ argument that the 
Attorney General’s decision to file an immunity certification is a “final 
agency action” that must comply with the Administrative Procedure 
Act.
257
 The court held that FISA’s immunity provision contains its own 
 
 
 247. Id. at 958–59 (citing S. REP. NO. 110-209 (2007)). 
 248. Id. at 959. 
 249. Id. at 956–58. 
 250. Id. at 959–64. 
 251. Id. at 963–64. 
 252. Id. at 964–71. 
 253. Id. at 970. 
 254. See id. 
 255. Id. at 970–71. 
 256. Id. The court also rejected constitutional challenges to the immunity provision based on due 
process and free speech principles. Id. at 971–74.  
 257. Id. at 974–76. 
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“substantial evidence” standard for judicial review, which displaces any 
separate APA review.
258
 
On December 29, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Judge Walker’s 
Order.
259
 The court rejected a variety of constitutional challenges to the 
immunity provision, including an argument under the nondelegation 
doctrine.
260
 According to the court, the fact that the Attorney General has 
discretion whether to invoke the immunity provision in itself does not 
deprive the legislation of an intelligible principle for executive action.
261
 
The statute contains an intellible principle governing the Attorney 
General’s conduct, the court held, because it identifies specific categories 
under which the Attorney General is authorized to exercise such 
discretion.
262
 
As with cases concerning the FISA procedures, then, litigation 
challenging the warrantless wiretap program under nondelegation and 
related constitutional principles thus far has failed. 
IV. TOWARDS A POLICY MATRIX FOR EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND 
CYBERSECURITY 
Our discussion of cybersecurity and executive power thus far seems to 
leave us with few meaningful checks over the President’s power to shut 
down cyberspace. In fact, the lawmakers who are sponsoring the current 
cybersecurity legislation believe the President already has authority to 
“shut down” the Internet under the Telecommunications Act of 1934.263 
However, in an important cyber-safety context not directly related to 
terrorism—child pornography—the Supreme Court, or at least some of its 
Justices, has signaled more of a cyber-exceptionalist posture that is 
significantly more wary of governmental regulation. Indeed, policy 
choices concerning presidential power and cybersecurity may turn as 
much on how lawmakers and courts construe “cyberspace” as on how they 
construe the Constitution.  
This Part examines recent conflicting cyber-maximalist and cyber-
minimalist strains of cybersecurity policy. The subsequent Part then offers 
 
 
 258. Id. Finally, the court also rejected plaintiffs’ claims that the Attorney General’s certification 
was substantively inadequate under FISA’s immunity provision. Id. at 975–76. 
 259. In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records Litig., 2011 WL 6823154 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 260. Id. at *5–14.  
 261. Id. at *7. 
 262. Id. 
 263. S. REP. NO. 111-368, at 10 (2010). 
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a matrix of options for presidential power and cybersecurity that 
incorporates the intersection of the cyber and constitutional domains. 
A. Cyber-Minimalism: Cybersecurity and The Telecommunications Act of 
1934 
Perhaps the broadest recent assertion of executive authority over 
cyberspace was made in the report on the PCNA prepared by the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. As noted 
above, the committee report stated that “[s]ection 706 [of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1934] gives the President the authority to take 
over wire communications in the United States and, if the President so 
chooses, shut a network down.”264  
Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1934 delegates 
authority to the President to take emergency measures in times of war or 
national emergency:  
Upon proclamation by the President that there exists war or a threat 
of war, or a state of public peril or disaster or other national 
emergency, or in order to preserve the neutrality of the United 
States, the President, if he deems it necessary in the interest of 
national security or defense, may suspend or amend, for such time 
as he may see fit, the rules and regulations applicable to any or all 
stations or devices capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations 
within the jurisdiction of the United States . . . .
265
 
The President’s authority to assume control of privately owned 
communications lines was first exercised during World War I pursuant to 
a joint resolution of Congress.
266
 A North Dakota state telephone system 
challenged the President’s assertion of total control of telephone networks 
under the joint resolution.
267
 The precise issue in the case was whether the 
President could regulate purely intrastate telephone rates.
268
 The case 
reached the Supreme Court, which held that the joint resolution authorized 
 
 
 264. Id. 
 265. 47 U.S.C. § 606(c) (2006). 
 266. H.R.J. Res. 309, 65th Cong. (1918). The joint resolution stated that “the President during the 
continuance of the present war is authorized and empowered, whenever he shall deem it necessary for 
the national security or defense, to supervise or to take possession and assume control of any 
telegraph, telephone, marine cable, or radio system or systems, or any part thereof . . . .” Id. It required 
“just compensation” to be paid to the owners of such facilities. Id. 
 267. Dakota Cent. Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U.S. 163 (1919). 
 268. Id. at 170. 
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“the President to take complete possession and control to enable the full 
operation of the lines embraced in the authority,” including the power to 
fix intrastate billing rates.
269
 
During World War II, shortly after Congress’s Declaration of War 
against Japan, President Roosevelt invoked his authority under § 706 to 
establish a Defense Communications Board, subsequently renamed the 
“Board of War Communications.”270 The Board of War Communications 
was authorized to allocate radio frequencies and facilities for military 
use.
271
 However, the executive order stipulated that “[n]o radio station or 
facility shall be taken over and operated in whole or in part or subjected to 
government supervision, control or closure unless such action is essential 
to national defense and security and the successful conduct of the war.”272 
The Board of War Communications was disbanded after the conclusion of 
World War II.
273
 Since then, executive orders have provided that various 
agencies, including the Federal Communications Commission, should 
adopt contingency plans for war and national emergencies.
274
  
The Telecommunications Act of 1934 and these historical examples of 
presidential authority under, of course, relate to the pre-Internet age. 
Would Internet services and infrastructure fall within the definition of 
“stations or devices capable of emitting electromagnetic radiations within 
the jurisdiction of the United States” over which the President can assert 
control under § 706?
275
 Read literally, this definition would cover any 
device powered by electricity. In conjunction with the reference to 
suspension or emendation of “rules and regulations applicable” to such 
“stations or devices,” however, it seems clear that this section is referring 
to broadcast facilities and equipment already regulated by the federal 
government.
276
 
Indeed, a recent FCC report on emergency preparedness equivocates 
over the FCC’s authority to regulate cybersecurity infrastructure.277 It 
 
 
 269. Id. at 184. 
 270. Exec. Order No. 8964, 6 Fed. Reg. 6367 (Dec. 12, 1941), as amended by Exec. Order No. 
9183, 7 Fed. Reg. 4509 (June 17, 1942). 
 271. Id. §§ 1–4. 
 272. Id. § 5. 
 273. Exec. Order No. 9831, 12 Fed. Reg. 1363 (Feb. 26, 1947). 
 274. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,092, 28 Fed. Reg. 1847 (Feb. 28, 1963); Exec. Order No. 
11,490, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,567 (Oct. 30, 1969); Exec. Order No. 12,656, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,491 (Nov. 18, 
1988). 
 275. 47 U.S.C. § 606(c) (2006).  
 276. Id.  
 277. See PUB. SAFETY & HOMELAND SEC. BUREAU, FCC PREPAREDNESS FOR MAJOR PUBLIC 
EMERGENCIES: CHAIRMAN’S 30 DAY REVIEW (2009), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_ 
public/attachmatch/DOC-293332A1.pdf. 
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notes that the scope of the FCC’s authority depends upon whether an IP-
based service is classified as a “telecommunications service” or an 
“information service” under the Telecommunications Act of 1996.278 If an 
IP-based service is an “information service,” the report notes, “the extent 
of the FCC’s authority to regulate information services . . . has not been 
defined clearly.”279 
In fact, the question whether the Internet is a “telecommunications 
service” or an “information service”—or something else altogether—is the 
subject of intense debate.
280
 As Susan Crawford notes, traditional 
telecommunications law involved two broad categories: “(1) regulated 
telephony, radio, and broadcast (dependent on radio or wired 
communications, and subject to ‘public trustee’ or common carriage 
obligations); and (2) largely unregulated newspaper and cinema (the 
‘print’ model, not dependent on radio or wired communications).”281 
Congress has delegated regulatory authority to the FCC over broadcasters, 
telecommunications providers, satellite and cable providers, and wireless 
carriers, which fall into the first category.
282
 Communication providers in 
the second category are unregulated by the FCC. The Internet, as 
Crawford observes, “sweeps aside” these regulatory “silos”; it combines 
aspects of each category and then transcends categorization by facilitating 
new human interaction.
283
  
In short, the question is not merely one of regulating certain kinds of 
physical facilities. It is about the fundamental governance of culture. The 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs’ 
conclusion that § 706 authorizes the President to shut down the Internet, 
then, represents a dramatic and unprecedented assertion of authority over 
Internet governance. It stakes out a firm minimalist stance in the ongoing 
debate between cyber-exceptionalists and cyber-minimalists. Not all 
sources of cyber policy in American law would agree, as the following 
discussion on child pornography demonstrates. 
 
 
 278. Id. at 26. 
 279. Id. 
 280. See, e.g., Susan P. Crawford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital Age, 74 
FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2005); Susan P. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications 
Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 359 (2007); Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535 (2010). 
 281. Crawford, The Internet and the Project of Communications Law, supra note 280, at 366 
(footnotes omitted). 
 282. Id. 
 283. Id. at 366–70. 
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B. Cyber-Maximalism (or Cyber-Middle-ism): Child Pornography 
Child pornography is one of the most hotly contested areas of what 
could broadly be called “cybersecurity.” Although the problem of child 
pornography itself is not the focus of this Article, which is concerned with 
national security issue, cases involving online child pornography statutes 
are instructive concerning the difficult constitutional issues arising from 
efforts to regulate the Internet.  
In Reno v. ACLU the Supreme Court addressed an effort by Congress 
to control Internet child pornography: the Communications Decency Act 
of 1996 (“CDA”).284 The CDA prohibited the knowing transmission of 
obscene or indecent messages to children less than eighteen years of 
age.
285
 Among other things, it banned the use of “any interactive computer 
service to display [obscene material] in a manner available to a person 
under 18 years of age,” and made it a crime to “knowingly permit” the use 
of a telecommunications facility “with the intent that it be used for such” 
purposes.
286
 The statute included a good faith defense, and created a safe 
harbor for providers of Internet service and websites that required certain 
forms of proof of age, such as a credit card.
287
 
The law was challenged by different groups of plaintiffs that included 
civil liberties organizations and library and publishing trade groups.
288
 The 
Supreme Court found the challenged portion of the law unconstitutional.
289
  
Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens sounded a remarkably 
exceptionalist note concerning Internet regulation. The Court had 
previously upheld government regulation of obscene and indecent speech 
involving the sale of pornography to minors, a radio broadcast of “filthy 
words,” and a zoning ordinance segregating adult movie theaters from 
residential neighborhoods.
290
 In each of these areas, Justice Stevens noted, 
the media involved were intrusive into daily life, and there was a long 
history of government regulation.
291
  
But, he said, “[t]hose factors are not present in cyberspace.”292 Indeed, 
“[n]either before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the vast 
 
 
 284. 521 U.S. 844 (1997). 
 285. Id. at 859–60. 
 286. Id. at 860 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 223(d) (1994 & Supp. II)). 
 287. Id. at 860–61. 
 288. Id. at 861–62 & nn.27–28. 
 289. Id. at 882.  
 290. Id. at 865–79 (citing City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)). 
 291. Id.  
 292. Id. at 868. 
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democratic forums of the Internet been subject to the type of government 
supervision and regulation that has attended the broadcast industry.”293 
And, he stated, “the Internet is not as ‘invasive’ as radio or television.”294 
The CDA was invalidated because, in the unique context of the Internet, 
its restrictions were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.
295
 
In an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part from the 
majority opinion, Justice O’Connor wrote that the creation of “adult 
zones” on the Internet could pass constitutional muster if the technology 
develops to a point at which screening for age is possible. Her view of the 
geography of cyberspace was perhaps even more exceptionalist than 
Justice Stevens’s. While it is relatively easy to create adult-only zones in 
real space, she noted, “[t]he electronic world is fundamentally 
different.”296 In “cyberspace,” Justice O’Connor said, speakers can mask 
their identities, locations, ages, and other distinguishing features, in a way 
that is not possible in the real world.
297
  
Justice O’Connor also observed that cyberspace is “malleable,” 
meaning that it may one day be feasible to “construct [virtual] barriers” 
between adults and children.
298
 Such a “transformation of cyberspace,” she 
concluded, however, had not yet progressed to the point at which age-
related zoning could occur without unconstitutionally impinging on the 
First Amendment rights of adults.
299
 However, Justice O’Connor would 
have upheld the CDA to the extent it covered a “transmission” of indecent 
materials between one adult and one or more minors.
300
 
Congress regrouped after Reno v. ACLU and enacted a more focused 
child pornography law, the Child Online Protection Act (“COPA”). COPA 
applied only to “communication for commercial purposes” on the World 
Wide Web that was comprised of “material that is harmful to minors.”301 
COPA was immediately challenged by the ACLU and other civil liberties 
groups and media entities.
302
 The statute was examined by the Supreme 
Court on two separate occasions and then tested through a bench trial, 
ultimately resulting in a permanent injunction against its enforcement.
303
 
 
 
 293. Id. at 868–69. 
 294. Id. at 869. 
 295. Id. at 875–86. 
 296. Id. at 889 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 890. 
 299. Id. at 890–91. 
 300. Id. 
 301. 47 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (2000). 
 302. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft I), 535 U.S. 564, 571 n.4 (2002) (plurality opinion). 
 303. See Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 566–86 (plurality opinion); Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 
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In its first trip to the Court, the Justices examined COPA’s use of 
“community standards” to determine what sort of content is “harmful to 
minors.”304 This test was based on the Court’s prior obscenity standard set 
forth in Miller v. California.
305
 The appellate court had concluded that 
Miller’s community standards test was inapplicable to Internet 
communications and the Web “because ‘Web publishers are currently 
without the ability to control the geographic scope of the recipients of their 
communications.’”306 The Court disagreed that this problem of geographic 
under determination rendered the statute unconstitutional.
307
 
Writing for a plurality, Justice Thomas sidestepped the geographic 
question by noting that “community standards need not be defined by 
reference to a precise geographic area.”308 This is particularly the case, 
Justice Thomas stated, when an obscenity statute precisely identifies 
material that will apply to the prurient interest and lacks serious value.
309
 
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor agreed that a “community 
standards” test could potentially be applied in the online environment, so 
that COPA was not facially unconstitutional.
310
 However, she noted that 
divergent local community standards could support an as-applied 
challenge in a particular case.
311
 
In a separate concurrence, Justice Breyer interpreted “community 
standards” in COPA to refer to a national adult community, which in his 
view allowed the statute to pass constitutional muster.
312
 But if COPA 
were interpreted to require geographically local standards, Justice Breyer 
 
 
U.S. 656 (2004); ACLU v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1032 
(2009). 
 304. Ashcroft I, 535 U.S. at 570. COPA defined “material that is harmful to minors” as material 
that  
(A) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would find, taking the 
material as a whole and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed to 
pander to, the prurient interest;  
(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner patently offensive with respect to minors, an 
actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or perverted 
sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or post-pubescent female breast; and 
(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value for minors.  
Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(b)). 
 305. Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)). 
 306. Id. at 575 (quoting ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 180 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 307. Id. at 585–86. 
 308. Id. at 576. 
 309. Id. at 580. 
 310. Id. at 586–87 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 311. Id. at 587–88. 
 312. Id. at 589–91 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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stated, this would “provide the most puritan of communities with a 
heckler’s Internet veto affecting the rest of the Nation,” and therefore 
would render the statute unconstitutional.
313
  
Justice Kennedy authored yet another concurrence, joined by Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg.
314
 Justice Kennedy believed the appellate court 
should have resolved various thorny questions of statutory interpretation 
before determining that the Act was facially unconstitutional.
315
 For 
example, Justice Kennedy noted that the hyperlinked context of Web 
content must bear on “the vexing question of what it means to evaluate 
Internet material ‘as a whole.’”316 
Justice Stevens dissented.
317
 For him, “[i]n the context of the Internet 
. . . community standards become a sword, rather than a shield.”318 This is 
because, he stated, “[t]he Internet presents a unique forum for 
communication because information, once posted, is accessible 
everywhere on the network at once.”319 He concluded, “[i]f a prurient 
appeal is offensive in a puritan village, it may be a crime to post it on the 
World Wide Web.”320 In the physical world, communities can self-
segregate based on considerations, such as what sort of speech is 
tolerable.
321
 However, Justice Stevens stated, this is impossible “in 
cyberspace.”322 A “community that wishes to live without certain 
material,” he concluded, “rids not only itself, but the entire Internet, of the 
offending speech.”323 
The Court’s first tussle with COPA thus highlighted the Justices’ 
differing perspectives on Internet exceptionalism. For Justice Thomas, the 
Internet was merely instrumental to activities in physical space; for Justice 
O’Connor, it was an extension of activities in physical space, which could 
potentially be partitioned like real space; and for Justice Stevens, it was 
something irreducibly new.
324
 
 
 
 313. Id. at 590. 
 314. Id. at 591–603 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 315. Id. at 592. 
 316. Id. at 600. 
 317. Id. at 602–12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 318. Id. at 603. 
 319. Id. at 605. 
 320. Id. at 603. 
 321. Id. at 612 (“Those who abhor and those who tolerate sexually explicit speech can seek out 
like-minded people and settle in communities that share their views on what is acceptable for 
themselves and their children.”). 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See supra notes 308–11, 317–23.  
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After remand, the Third Circuit once again upheld the preliminary 
injunction against COPA’s enforcement, and the Supreme Court once 
again granted certiorari.
325
 In a relatively terse opinion written by Justice 
Kennedy, the majority agreed with the lower court that blocking and 
filtering software offered a less restrictive alternative to COPA’s broad 
legal prohibitions, and therefore upheld the preliminary injunction.
326
 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Stevens supplemented his Internet 
exceptionalist theme with a self-regulation note.
327
 “Encouraging 
deployment of user-based controls,” he stated, “would serve Congress’ 
interest in protecting minors from sexually explicit Internet materials as 
well or better than attempting to regulate the vast content of the World 
Wide Web at its source, and at far less significant cost to First Amendment 
values.”328 
Justice Scalia dissented because he believed COPA should not have 
been subjected to strict scrutiny.
329
 Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, 
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O’Connor.330 According to 
Justice Breyer, COPA regulated only a very specific and narrow kind of 
obscene speech as permitted under Miller v. California.
331
 Moreover, he 
was persuaded that web site proprietors could comply with the statutory 
age screening requirements at minimal cost—in other words, that it had 
indeed become technologically and economically feasible to zone the 
Internet.
332
 Finally, he was not persuaded that filtering and blocking 
software was reliable enough or widely enough available to serve as a 
surrogate for legal regulation.
333
 Ultimately, then, Justice Breyer adopted 
the moderate cyber-exceptionalism exhibited by Justice O’Connor in Reno 
v. ACLU.
334
 
V. THE MATRIX 
Cyberspace is different—or is it? The Internet is essentially a collection 
of physical assets that can be commandeered during war or national 
 
 
 325. See Ashcroft v. ACLU (Ashcroft II), 542 U.S. 656 (2004). 
 326. Id. at 667–68. 
 327. Id. at 673–75 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 328. Id. at 674. 
 329. Id. at 676 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 330. Id. at 676–91 (Breyer, J. dissenting). 
 331. Id. at 678–79.  
 332. Id. at 682. 
 333. Id. at 685. Moreover, Justice Breyer noted that private filtering and screening software was 
the status quo against which COPA was enacted, not a less restrictive legislative alternative. Id. at 684. 
 334. See supra notes 296–300 and accompanying text. 
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emergency like telephone ground lines—or is it? The nondelegation 
doctrine and related constitutional checks supply few substantive restraints 
on presidential authority in times of war or national emergency—or do 
they? As the preceding Parts illustrate, courts have provided inconsistent 
answers to these questions. There does not appear to be a unified 
perspective on what “cyberspace” represents, or what degree of control the 
Executive should be empowered to assert over it. 
A. Building the Matrix 
It might be helpful to align differing answers to these questions in a 
policy matrix, as follows: 
 
Cyberspace 
 
Minimalist Maximalist 
Constitution / Non 
delegation 
Minimalist Maximalist 
 
Cyberspace 
 
Minimalist Maximalist 
Constitution / Non 
delegation 
Minimalist Maximalist 
 
Cyberspace 
 
Minimalist Maximalist 
Constitution / Non 
delegation 
Minimalist Maximalist 
 
Cyberspace 
 
Minimalist Maximalist 
Constitution / Non 
delegation 
Minimalist Maximalist 
 
“Cyberspace” in this matrix refers to whether the Internet is considered 
a truly new, emergent “space” that transcends its physical layers or 
whether the Internet is essentially reducible to the cables, switches, and so 
on, that enable networked communication. “Maximalist” means the 
former; “Minimalist,” the latter. “Constitution / Nondelegation” refers to 
the limitations the U.S. Constitution places on the President to control the 
Internet. “Minimalist” means Congress is able to delegate broad authority 
to the Executive to regulate the Internet; “Maximalist” means the 
Constitution strongly restrains what the Executive can do in this medium. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss4/2
  
 
 
 
 
2012] CYBERSECURITY AND EXECUTIVE POWER 839 
 
 
 
 
The recent bills in Congress reflect a “minimalist” perspective both on 
the nature of cyberspace and on the constitutional restrictions on the 
Executive’s authority to control cyberspace.335 This is most tellingly 
revealed in the report on the PCNA prepared by the Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, which asserted presidential 
authority over the Internet under a 1934 statute that addresses telephone 
lines.
336
  
Indeed, the cyber-minimalism of the current congressional proposals is 
reflected even in the popular title of the PCNA. It is odd and incongruous 
for a bill in the Congress to describe “cyberspace” as a “national asset” of 
the United States. This perspective seems tone deaf to the ongoing debates 
over Internet governance, and in particular to the claim that the United 
States has historically sought to exert undue control over this global 
network.
337
 This perspective stands in contrast to other sources of legal 
authority in the United States, particularly the Supreme Court’s opinions 
on Internet pornography, which recognize that cyberspace is, indeed, in 
some sense unique.  
Existing congressional proposals also are “minimalist” concerning the 
constitutional restrictions on the Executive. Although the recent proposals 
include some checks that move somewhat away from a hard “minimalist” 
view of the limits of the nondelegation doctrine—or at least “punt” such 
hard choices to a rule-making process—the Executive’s discretion over 
whether to declare an emergency and what measures to take under such a 
declaration remains broad.
338
 Perhaps most significantly, there is no 
provision for judicial review of emergency declarations or of any required 
emergency measures.
339
 
B. Entering the Matrix 
From a cyber-civil libertarian perspective, it is tempting to argue for a 
“maximalist-maximalist” option. Much of the opposition to the “Internet 
kill switch” in the blogosphere—including the term “kill switch”—reflects 
an assumption that the Internet is sui generis and that executive power 
over it should be sharply constrained. But the maximalist-maximalist 
perspective seems to lack the hard headedness required in the face of the 
 
 
 335. See supra Part II.B. 
 336. See supra note 52. 
 337. See, e.g., Jonathon W. Penney, Privacy and the New Virtualism, 10 YALE J. L. & TECH. 194, 
196–98 (2008) (describing historical debate). 
 338. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 339. See supra notes 79 and 85 and accompanying text. 
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very real threats posed by cyberwar, cybercrime, and cyberterrorism. If the 
scenarios and statistics offered in the recent spate of books and reports on 
cybersecurity are even half-true, the prospects for disruption are 
frightening.
340
 A better approach is to recognize both the unique nature of 
the Internet and the unique role of the Executive in the event of war, a 
terrorist attack, or a disaster with respect to physical assets—that is, a 
framework that is cyber-maximalist but that adopts a sliding scale between 
constitutional minimalism and maximalism depending on the nature and 
scope of executive authority being asserted. 
A key aspect of cyber-maximalism is commitment to the Internet’s 
uniqueness. The debate over “cyberutopianism” or “exceptionalism,” of 
course, has a long (in Internet time) history.
341
 The “non-exceptionalist” 
thesis has been ably defended by Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, among 
others, who correctly observe that the Internet is physically comprised of 
routers, cables, servers, and other hardware that reside in real space under 
the jurisdiction of real sovereign governments.
342
 Similarly, Orin Kerr 
notes that cyberutopianism is rooted in the political (and psychedelic 
consciousness bending) counterculture of the 1960s and has, along with 
that counterculture, largely been demolished by reality.
343
 
But if cyberutopianism is dead, a realist conception of the new, 
emergent properties of the cultural construction facilitated by those 
routers, cables, and servers remains very much alive.
344
 As Dan Hunter 
and Greg Lastowka have observed in relation to law in “virtual worlds,” 
such as the game “Second Life,” “virtual worlds are jurisdictions separate 
from our own, with their own distinctive community norms, laws, and 
rights.”345  
 
 
 340. See supra Part II.A. 
 341. See Penney, supra note 337; see also Orin S. Kerr, Enforcing Law Online, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 
745, 751–54 (2007). 
 342. See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD (2006). 
 343. Kerr, supra note 341, at 752–54. 
 344. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, Deconstructing Jefferson’s Candle: Towards a Critical 
Realist Approach to Cultural Environmentalism and Information Policy, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 203 
(2009). 
 345. F. Gregory Lastowka & Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1, 73 
(2004). Cyberspace in this regard is very roughly analogous to the relationship between the brain and 
the mind. For a description of this relationship, see WILLIAM HASKER, THE EMERGENT SELF (2011), 
and NANCEY MURPHY, BODIES AND SOULS, OR SPIRITED BODIES? (2006). Brains are collections of 
neural cells, other tissues, and chemicals that are entirely physical. “Mind” emerges from these 
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continually reconfigures the physical layer. 
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One approach with some promise is the “denationalized liberalism” 
advocated by Milton Mueller.
346
 Mueller recognizes that information 
transcends the boundaries of nation-states.
347
 A denationalized liberalism, 
he suggests, “holds a presumption in favor of networked, associative 
relations over hierarchical relations as a mode of transnational 
governance.”348 Internet governance, he argues, “should emerge primarily 
as a byproduct of many unilateral and bilateral decisions by its members to 
exchange or negotiate with other members (or to refuse to do so).”349 
Nevertheless, because “people are deeply situated within national laws and 
institutions regarding such basic matters as contracts, property, crime, 
education, and welfare,” national law must continue to play an important 
role, albeit a role that is “contain[ed]” by international associative 
relations.
350
 
Although some of Mueller’s ideasmight be problematic, he is on the 
right track. “Cyberspace” in some sense transcends the physical cables and 
switches that make the Internet possible. The Internet, therefore, is not 
merely a “national asset” of any state, and the security of “cyberspace” is 
an international concern that should be subject to international oversight. 
U.S. policymakers should take the lead in promoting the construction of a 
multilateral cybersecurity apparatus. The recognition that cybersecurity 
ultimately is an international Internet governance issue supplies an 
important interface with a modest account of constitutional limitations on 
the Executive’s authority, particularly in relation to the nondelegation 
doctrine. 
How can the nondelegation doctrine limit executive power over 
cyberspace? Given its generous interpretation, even in the heated context 
of the War on Terror, the nondelegation doctrine might seem dead in the 
water. Some commentators bemoan this fact and argue that it should be 
revitalized.
351
 Paul Diller, for example, suggests that a revitalized 
nondelegation doctrine is particularly important in the wake of expanding 
 
 
 346. MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTERNET 
GOVERNANCE (2010). 
 347. Id. at 269. 
 348. Id. 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. 
 351. See, e.g., Douglas H. Ginsburg & Steven Menashi, Nondelegation and the Unitary Executive, 
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 251, 263–64 (2010) (arguing that “[w]hat is needed, in short, is a Court that 
recognizes that the nondelegation principle—although it is, like judicial review itself, a predominantly 
structural rather than a textual element—is no less a part of the judiciary’s charge to uphold the 
Constitution”).  
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executive power and the executive detention of terror suspects after 
September 11.
352
  
Others, including Cass Sunstein, argue that “[r]eports of the death of 
the nondelegation doctrine have been greatly exaggerated.”353 Sunstein 
suggests that the nondelegation doctrine has been “relocated” into a series 
of smaller rules that he calls “nondelegation canons.”354 These rules 
restrict in various ways the ability of administrative agencies to make 
certain kinds of decisions without express congressional authorization.
355
 
He views these canons as an important democratic check on administrative 
agency action.
356
  
As Sunstein acknowledges, a cornerstone of administrative law 
jurisprudence—the Chevron doctrine—is a pro-delegation rule, in that it 
permits agencies to invoke “reasonable” interpretations of their mandates 
if Congress has not directly decided the precise question under review.
357
 
However, he surveys a number of subsidiary canons that limit agency 
discretion even under Chevron.
358
 The most significant, for purposes of 
this Article, are those related to sovereignty.
359
 An agency cannot 
significantly compromise the sovereignty of a foreign nation, an Indian 
tribe, or the United States.
360
 This related set of principles reflects the 
understanding that the Executive should not make sensitive judgments 
about national sovereignty and international relations without consulting 
Congress.
361
  
While general principles of presidential authority recognize the 
Executive’s unique role in conducting war and foreign affairs, this 
nondelegation “canon” relating to the sovereignty of foreign nations 
suggests that Congress should not—and perhaps cannot—authorize the 
 
 
 352. Paul Diller, Habeas and (Non-)Delegation, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 585 (2010). Diller suggests 
that the Court’s recent Suspension Clause jurisprudence weakens Congress’s ability to craft flexible 
and robust alternatives to habeas corpus. Id. at 630–33. A better alternative, he argues, would have 
been for the Court to strike down the Combatant Status Review Tribunals established by the Bush 
Administration, which were ratified by Congress in the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, as an 
improper delegation of authority to the President. Id. at 636–37. Diller notes that “Congress said 
almost nothing specific about how the CSRTs should function” and failed to define who was an 
“enemy combatant,” and therefore did not provide even the requisite intelligible principle for the 
exercise of executive discretion. Id. at 637–41. 
 353. Sunstein, supra note 145, at 315. 
 354. Id. at 315–16. 
 355. Id. at 316. 
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President to control “cyberspace.” Internet and other “cyber” 
communications emerge from global networks that implicate the sovereign 
interests of many states. As the World Summit on the Information 
Society’s Declaration of Principles states “[p]olicy authority for Internet-
related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States” (plural)—
recognizing that no one State can control the Internet.
362
  
The Declaration of Principles also assumes that international 
cooperation is vital because cyberspace truly is something sui generis, a 
new form of global culture. The Declaration notes, “[t]he Information 
Society is intrinsically global in nature and national efforts need to be 
supported by effective international and regional cooperation among 
governments, the private sector, civil society and other stakeholders 
. . . .”363 Therefore, “building an inclusive Information Society requires 
new forms of solidarity, partnership and cooperation among governments 
and other stakeholders, i.e.[,] the private sector, civil society and 
international organizations.”364 The cybersecurity crisis further highlights 
the need for truly international and transnational Internet governance 
against broad assertions of authority by any one state, including the United 
States. The dual recognition in the Declaration—that States have 
sovereign rights because cyberspace implicates real space, but also that 
cyberspace requires unique international cooperation—should inform a 
sliding scale of constitutional “minimalism” or “maximalism” concerning 
U.S. cybersecurity policy.  
When cyberattacks impact key physical infrastructure, the national 
sovereign requires the flexibility to act promptly and decisively. With this 
kind of limited impact, a sort of constitutional minimalism is appropriate. 
Constitutional minimalism in this context simply means that, with respect 
to physical assets located in American territory, the President can invoke 
emergency procedures when there is a significant threat to life, health, or 
the national economy. Even under such constitutional minimalism, 
emergency procedures must after a short contingency period become 
subject to direct congressional oversight and judicial review. However, 
broader deference should be afforded to the Executive’s determinations. 
For example, a presidential order to shut down a nuclear power plant that 
 
 
 362. World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva 2003–Tunis 2005, Declaration of 
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has been infected by a Stuxnet-like malware attack would be subject to 
broad deference upon judicial review. 
The scale should tip towards constitutional maximalism—in other 
words, stricter scrutiny—when emergency measures begin to impinge on 
the culture that emerges from cyber-infrastructure, particularly concerning 
core expressive concerns, such as the freedoms of speech, privacy, and 
association. For example, if the Executive claims that protecting the 
electricity grid from a cyberattack requires shutting down major Internet 
routing hubs, and thereby restricts the free flow of general email and Web 
communications, this measure should be subject to stricter scrutiny. 
Moreover, consistent with cyber-maximalism, any restrictions that will 
interfere with global Internet communications eventually should become 
subject to review by a multilateral international body. A policy space that 
incorporates these flexible safeguards will help protect the national 
security interests of the United States and other sovereign states with 
minimal interference over cyberspace’s unique democratizing potential. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Cyberspace is under constant attack. Because real space is increasingly 
connected to cyberspace, this means that facilities and institutions 
previously considered national resources—power grids, telephone 
communication systems, television networks, financial exchanges—are 
also cyber-resources. Under a system of constitutional democracy, as in 
the United States, the Executive must have some authority to take 
emergency actions required to protect such resources in the event of a 
natural disaster or an attack. This must include the authority to act in the 
face of a serious cyberattack. 
But cyberspace is more than real space. Cyberspace’s physical 
infrastructure facilitates the emergence of culture. This emergent property 
of cyberspace transcends national boundaries and bears enormous 
potential for democratization, as was vividly illustrated in Egypt’s 
“Facebook Revolution.” Yet, as Egypt’s struggle also demonstrates—and 
as arguably has also been true of America’s War on Terror—executive 
power over the Internet is a key arrow in the quiver of tyranny.  
A balanced cybersecurity policy must account for all these dynamics. It 
must recognize the threat of cyberattack without losing—indeed, in light 
of—the uniqueness of cyber culture. It must require judicial scrutiny over 
emergency measures, on a sliding scale depending on the extent to which 
such measures are likely to impact cyber culture in addition to physical 
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assets. And it must tie in to an international framework, so that the 
promise of cyberspace can remain open to everyone. 
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